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Abstract
We consider zero sum stochastic differential games with possibly path–dependent controlled state. Unlike
the previous literature, we allow for weak solutions of the state equation so that the players’ controls are
automatically of feedback type. Under some restrictions, needed for the a priori regularity of the upper and
lower value functions of the game, we show that the game value exists when both the appropriate path–
dependent Isaacs condition, and the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of the corresponding path–dependent
Isaacs–HJB equation hold. We also provide a general verification argument and a characterisation of saddle–
points by means of an appropriate notion of second–order backward SDE.
Key words: Stochastic differential games, viscosity solutions of path–dependent PDEs, second–order back-
ward SDEs.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: 35D40, 35K10, 60H10, 60H30.
1 Introduction
Stochastic differential games have attracted important attention during the last three decades. Due to the crucial
role of the information structure, the corresponding literature is technically and conceptually more involved than
standard stochastic control. It had been recognised as early as in the 60s, in a series of papers by Varaiya [66],
Roxin [56] and Elliot and Kalton [24], in the context of deterministic differential games, that having both players
play a classical control generally led to ill–posed problems, and that the appropriate notion was rather that of
a strategy, that is to say that a given player uses a non–anticipative map from the other player’s set of controls
to his own set of controls. Earlier definitions of value functions for games require appropriate approximations
procedures, by discrete–time games in Fleming’s definition [30, 31, 32], or by discretising the players’s actions in
Friedman’s definition [35, 37] (see also Varaiya and Lin [67] for an earlier related notion). This makes the whole
approach technically cumbersome.
The connexion between the value function of the game and the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs partial
differential equation was formally established by Isaacs [42, 43] in the 50s. The Elliot–Kalton definition induces
an easy argument to prove rigorously this connexion by using the notion of viscosity solutions, see Evans and
Souganidis [29], as well as the generalisation by Evans and Ishii [28]1. The Elliot–Kalton strategies have been
successfully generalised to the context of stochastic differential games by Fleming and Souganidis [34], where
the above mentioned strategy map is restricted to adapted controls. Despite the asymmetry between the two
players of the induced game problem formulation, this approach has been followed by an important strand of
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1Notice that value functions in Friedman’s and Fleming’s definitions were also proved to be related to the HJI PDE by Souganidis
[63] and Barron, Evans and Jensen [2].
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the literature in continuous–time stochastic differential games, see notably the revisits of Buckdahn and Li [9] or
Fleming and Hernández-Hernández [33].
This approach has some important drawbacks, however. Besides some stemming from practical considerations,
see Remark 2.5, the asymmetry between the players makes the problem of existence of saddle–points much
harder in general. This justified the recent emergence of several alternative formulations of the game. While
the corresponding results may look similar at first sight, these reformulations have very subtle differences. We
shall devote Section 2 completely to an incremental presentation of the different formulations which appeared
in the literature, with appropriate examples highlighting the main differences. In particular, when the diffusion
coefficient is not controlled by any of the players, the problem is completely addressed in Hamadène and Lepeltier
[39], see Subsection 2.5. However, when the diffusion coefficient is also controlled, all the results in the literature
require the control/strategy to be simple in some sense. This constraint makes it essentially impossible to obtain
the existence of saddle points under those formulations.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that considering stochastic differential games in weak formulation
allows to bypass major difficulties pointed out in the previous literature. In our setting, introduced in Section
3.1, the controlled state process is a weak solution of the possibly path–dependent stochastic differential equation
dXαt = bt
(
Xα, α0t , α
1
t
)
dt+ σt
(
Xα, α0t , α
1
t
)
dWt,
where W is a Brownian motion with appropriate dimension, b and σ are non–anticipating functions of the path,
and α = (α0, α1) is the pair of controls of Players 0 and 1, respectively. We consider the largest set of controls
αi : [0, T ] × C0([0, T ]) 7−→ Ai, i = 0, 1, by only assuming the natural non–anticipativity and measurability
properties. In particular, we do not impose that they are simple in some sense so as to guarantee existence of a
strong solution for the above state equation. Again, our approach is to consider weak solutions, without requiring
uniqueness of such a solution.
Our first main result, reported in Theorem 3.6, states that, under the path–dependent Isaacs condition, uniqueness
of viscosity solutions implies existence of the game value. Section 4 contains the technical arguments to prove
this result, following the dynamic programming arguments as in Pham and Zhang [53]. Our proof relies on the
notion of path–dependent viscosity solutions, introduced by Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [18, 19]. Observe that this
result covers the Markovian setting under the uniqueness condition of viscosity solutions in the standard sense
of Crandall and Lions [14], as our set of test functions includes theirs. As our technique requires some a priori
regularity for the game upper and lower values, Theorem 3.6 is established under restricting conditions on the
coefficients b and σ which are essentially summarised in Assumption 3.5, see also Section 5 for a slight weakening
of these conditions. Notice that the remarkable work of Sîrbu [58, 59] does not need any such restrictions, as
the Perron–like method this author uses allows to bypass the task of deriving directly the dynamic programming
principle. However, the method is restricted to the Markovian setting, and the players controls are simple and
thus much less general than the ones we consider here.
As a second main result reported in Theorem 3.10, we provide a verification argument, still under the path-
dependent Isaacs condition, including a characterisation of saddle–points. We emphasise that when the volatility
of the diffusion is degenerate, this result is new, even in the special Markovian setting, as the value function
of the game may fail to lie in the standard Sobolev spaces, due to possible non–existence of a density of the
corresponding state equation. By further considering a convenient relaxation, we also provide in Theorem 3.20
a characterisation by means of an appropriate notion of second–order backward SDE, which plays the same role
as the Sobolev–type solution for the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi-Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI for short) partial
differential equation.
Notations: Throughout the paper, for i = 0, 1, we assume that the control of Player i takes values in Ai ⊂ Rdi ,
for some arbitrary integer di. We define A := A1 × A2, and denote typically the elements of A as a = (a0, a1).
Throughout this paper, for every p−dimensional vector b with p ∈ N, we denote by b1, . . . , bp its entries, for
1 ≤ i ≤ p. For α, β ∈ Rp we denote by α · β the usual inner product, with associated norm | · |. For any
(ℓ, c) ∈ N× N, Mℓ,c(R) denotes the space of ℓ× c matrices with real entries. The elements of matrix M ∈Mℓ,c
are denoted (M i,j)1≤i≤ℓ, 1≤j≤c, and the transpose of M is denoted by M
⊤. We identify Mℓ,1 with Rℓ. When
ℓ = c, we let Mℓ(R) := Mℓ,ℓ(R). We also denote by Sℓ (resp. Sℓ+) the set of symmetric (resp. symmetric
semi–definite positive) matrices in Mℓ(R). The trace of a matrix M ∈ Mℓ(R) will be denoted by Tr[M ]. For
further reference, we list here all the filtrations that will be used throughout the paper. For any filtration
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G := (Gt)0≤t≤T , and for any probability measure P on our space (Ω,F), we denote by GP := (GPt )0≤t≤T the
usual P−augmentation2 of G, and by G+ := (G+t )0≤t≤T the right–limit of G. Similarly, the right limit of GP
will be denoted by GP+ := (GP+t )0≤t≤T . For technical reasons, we also need to introduce the universal filtration
GU :=
(GUt )0≤t≤T defined by GUt := ∩P∈Prob(Ω)GPt , t ∈ [0, T ], where Prob(Ω) is the set of all probability measures
on (Ω,F), and we denote by GU+, the corresponding right–continuous limit. Moreover, for a subset P ⊂ Prob(Ω),
we introduce the set of P−polar sets NP := {N ⊂ Ω : N ⊂ A for some A ∈ FT with supP∈P P(A) = 0}, and
we introduce the P−completion of G, GP := (GPt )t∈[0,T ] , with GPt := GUt ∨ σ (NP) , t ∈ [0, T ], together with the
corresponding right–continuous limit GP+.
2 Stochastic differential game formulations and examples
In this section we introduce the main formulations of zero–sum stochastic differential games from the existing
literature, and explain through several examples why we have chosen to concentrate our attention on the "weak
formulation with control against control". The section is somewhat lengthy. However, due to the subtleties
involved in the formulations, we think such a detailed introduction will prove helpful for our readers.
2.1 Strong formulation with control against control
Fix some time horizon T > 0. In the strong formulation paradigm, a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F :=
(Ft)0≤t≤T ,P0), on which is defined a d−dimensional Brownian motionW , is fixed. We denote by FW the natural
filtration of W , augmented under P0, and for i = 0, 1, we let AiS denote the set of FW−progressively measurable
Ai−valued processes, and AS := A0S × A1S. Throughout the paper, we take the notational convention that we
write i as subscript for deterministic objects and as superscript for random objects. Consider then, for i = 0, 1
the following n−dimensional controlled state processes with controls α := (α0, α1) ∈ AS
Xαt :=
∫ t
0
b(s,Xαs , αs)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xαs , αs)dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], P0 − a.s. (2.1)
where b : [0, T ]×Rn×A −→ Rn and σ : [0, T ]×Rn×A −→ Rn×d are appropriate Borel measurable functions so
that the above SDE has a unique strong solution for any α ∈ AS. We introduce the so–called upper and lower
values of the game
V
S
0 := inf
α0∈A0
S
sup
α1∈A1
S
JS(α
0, α1), and V S0 := sup
α1∈A1
S
inf
α0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, α1), (2.2)
where the criterion of the players JS is defined, for some appropriate functions f : [0, T ] × Rn × A −→ R and
g : Rn −→ R, by
JS(α) := E
P0
[
g(XαT ) +
∫ T
0
f(t,Xαt , αt)dt
]
. (2.3)
It is clear by definition that V S0 ≤ V
S
0 . There are two central problems for the game defined above:
(i) Does the game value exists, namely V
S
0 = V
S
0?
(ii) Is there a saddle–point (also called equilibrium) for the game? That is to say, can we find some α̂ :=
(α̂0, α̂1) ∈ AS such that
JS(α̂
0, α1) ≤ JS(α̂0, α̂1) ≤ JS(α0, α̂1), for any α0 ∈ A0S, α1 ∈ A1S. (2.4)
Notice immediately that the existence of a saddle–point α̂ implies automatically that the game value exists, and
is equal to JS(α̂).
Despite the fact that the above formulation is very close to the usual framework of stochastic control, it has never
been considered in the literature, since even in seemingly benign situations, the game value may fail to exist.
2The P−augmentation is defined for any t ∈ [0, T ] by GPt := σ
(
Gt ∪N P
)
, where N P :=
{
A ⊂ Ω, A ⊂ B, with B ∈ FT , P[B] = 0
}
.
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Example 2.1. This is a simplified version of an example borrowed from R. Buckdahn, see [53, Appendix E].
Let A0 = A1 = [−1, 1], d = n = 2, and c ∈ R, ρ ∈ [−1, 1] be two constants. Consider the following specification
f := 0, g(x) :=
∣∣x1 − x2∣∣2, b(t, x, a) := (a0a1
)
, σ(t, x, a) :=
(
c 0
cρ c
√
1− ρ2
)
.
In this case, we have
X1,αt :=
∫ t
0
α0sds+ cW
1
t , X
2,α
t :=
∫ t
0
α1sds+ c
[
ρW 1t +
√
1− ρ2W 2t
]
, JS(α) := E
P0
[
|X1,αT −X2,αT |2
]
.
Then, we claim that
V S0 ≤ 2(1− ρ)c2T and T 2 ≤ V
S
0 .
so that V S0 < V
S
0 whenever 2(1− ρ)c2 < T , and the game does not have a value in this formulation. To see this,
notice that for any α1 ∈ A1S , if Player 0 also plays the control α1, we have
JS(α
1, α1) = EP0
[∣∣c(1 − ρ)W 1T − c√1− ρ2W 2T ∣∣2] = 2(1− ρ)c2T.
Thus infα0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, α1) ≤ 2(1− ρ)c2T , so that by arbitrariness of α1 ∈ A1S, we have V S0 ≤ 2(1− ρ)c2T . On the
other hand, for any α0 ∈ A0S, set
x0 := E
P0
[∫ T
0
α0sds
]
, sgn(x0) := 1{x0≥0} − 1{x0<0} ∈ A1, α1t := −sgn(x0), t ∈ [0, T ].
Then by Jensen’s inequality
JS(α
0, α1) ≥
∣∣∣EP0[X1,αT −X2,αT ]∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣EP0[∫ T
0
α0sds−
∫ T
0
α1sds
]∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣x0 + T sgn(x0)∣∣2 ≥ |T sgn(x0)|2 = T 2.
This implies that supα1∈A1
S
JS(α
0, α1) ≥ T 2 for any α0 ∈ A0S, and thus V
S
0 ≥ T 2.
We recall that the zero–sum game (2.1)–(2.3) is closely related to the following HJBI PDEs
−∂tv −H(t, x,Dv,D2v) = 0, −∂tv −H(t, x,Dv,D2v) = 0, (2.5)
where the Hamiltonians H,H are defined as:
h(t, x, z, γ, a) :=
1
2
Tr
[
(σσ⊤)(t, x, a)γ
]
+ b(t, x, a) · z + f(t, x, a), (t, x, z, γ, a) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Rd × Sd,
H(t, x, z, γ) := inf
a0∈A0
sup
a1∈A1
h(t, x, z, γ, a0, a1), H(t, x, z, γ) := sup
a1∈A1
inf
a0∈A0
h(t, x, z, γ, a0, a1).
(2.6)
Moreover, the following Isaacs condition is crucial for the existence of the game value:
H = H =: H. (2.7)
Under the above condition, we say (aˆ0, aˆ1) ∈ A is a saddle point of the Hamiltonian H at (t, x, z, γ) if
h(t, x, z, γ, aˆ0, a1) ≤ H(t, x, z, γ) ≤ h(t, x, z, γ, a0, aˆ1) for all a0 ∈ A0, a1 ∈ A1. (2.8)
Remark 2.2. Direct calculation reveals that the Isaacs condition (2.7) holds in the context of Example 2.1, with
H(z, γ) =
c2
2
(
γ11 + γ22 + 2ργ12
)
+ |z2| − |z1|, (z, γ) ∈ R2 × S2.
So the game value does not exist, despite the fact that Isaacs’s condition holds. Notice as well that when c = 0,
this is a deterministic game, and when c > 0 and |ρ| < 1, σ is non–degenerate. Thus potential degeneracy of the
diffusion coefficient is not the reason for the non–existence of the game value.
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2.2 Strong formulation with strategy against control
As we have seen above, naively considering games in a control against control formulation usually leads to non–
existence of the game value. One way to properly formalise the fact that in continuous–time differential games
the players also observe each other continuously consists in introducing the notion of non–anticipative strategies.
Roughly speaking, in such a framework a strategy for one player is simply a non–anticipative map from the
set of controls of the other player to the set of controls of this player. Though strategies were introduced in
deterministic games by Varaiya [66], Roxin [56] and Elliot and Kalton [24], the first work to extend this notion
in a stochastic setting is due to Fleming and Souganidis [34]. Let us now give a proper definition.
Definition 2.3. Let S0 denote the set of mappings a0 : A1S −→ A0S such that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], and any
(α1, α˜1) ∈ A1S ×A1S satisfying α1 = α˜1, ds× dP0−a.s. on [0, t]× Ω, we have a0(α1) = a0(α˜1), ds× dP0−a.s. on
[0, t]× Ω. Similarly we define S1 as the set of appropriate mappings a1 : A0S −→ A1S .
The upper and lower values in this formulation are then defined as
V
FS
0 := sup
a1∈S1
inf
α0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, a1(α0)), V FS0 := inf
a0∈S0
sup
α1∈A1
S
JS(a
0(α1), α1). (2.9)
We emphasise that in this framework, the upper value is defined as a sup inf, rather than an inf sup. Besides,
since the setting is by nature asymmetric, it is not a priori clear that
V FS0 ≤ V
FS
0 , or V
FS
0 ≤ V FS0 .
Nevertheless, this formulation has been very successful in the existing literature because the game value is
well understood, and characterised by the so–called Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs PDE. The main result of
Fleming and Souganidis [34, Theorem 2.6] is the following.
Theorem 2.4. Under appropriate technical conditions on the coefficients b, σ, f, g, we have V
FS
0 = v(0, 0),
V FS0 = v(0, 0), where v, v are viscosity solutions of the corresponding HJBI equations (2.5). In particular, if
Isaacs condition (2.7) holds, and the viscosity solution to the above PDEs is unique, then V
FS
0 = V
FS
0 , and the
game value exists.
Notice that the approach of Fleming and Souganidis [34] has been substantially improved and simplified by
Buckdahn and Li [9] (see also the works of Bouchard, Moreau and Nutz [6] and Bouchard and Nutz [7] for a similar
approach in stochastic target games), who considered a similar framework, allowing for controls depending on the
full past of the trajectories of W (implying in particular that their cost functionals become random variables),
and also for more general running cost functionals in the form of backward SDEs. Though their framework
remains Markovian, a recent extension to non–Markovian dynamics has been proposed by Zhang [69, 70], relying
on top of the BSDE method of Buckdahn and Li, on an approximation of the non–Markovian game by sequences
of standard Markovian games.
While the above results are beautiful mathematically, it has two major drawbacks, as illustrated in the following
two remarks.
Remark 2.5. The strategies are typically difficult to implement in practice.
(i) In the problem V
FS
0 , Player 1 needs to observe the control α
0 of Player 0. But since this is a zero–sum game,
the players typically would not tell their competitors their controls, due to the so–called moral hazard.
(ii) Notice further that the strategy a1 is a function of the whole process α1, rather than the paths of α1. This
imposes further difficulty for the practical implementation of non–anticipative strategies. Even in the full infor-
mation case (without moral hazard), the players do not actually observe their opponent’s adapted control, but just
a realisation of this control in the actual state of the world.
Remark 2.6. The study of the existence of saddle–points in this setting also proves very difficult. Among some
of the reasons, we would like to highlight the following.
(i) The information is asymmetric in this setting. As a consequence, it is not possible to define saddle–points as
conveniently as in the spirit of (2.4).
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(ii) The problem V
FS
0 can be viewed as a zero–sum Stackelberg game, which requires to solve sequential optimisation
problems. Given a1, it will in general be difficult to solve infα0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, a1(α0)), since as a general strategy
there are not many properties we can impose on a1. The optimisation over a1 can then become even harder.
(iii) Moreover, we emphasise that this formulation is still in a strong setting, namely all involved processes are
required to be FW−progressively measurable. In this case, the set AS of admissible controls is typically not
compact, meaning that saddle–points are even less likely to exist.
We illustrate the above points by considering two examples where saddle–points cannot exist, no matter how one
defines them. For this purpose, we borrow a function ζ from Barlow [1] which satisfies the following properties
(1) ζ : R −→ [1, 2] and is uniformly Hölder continuous.
(2) The following SDE admits a unique (in law) weak solution but no strong solution
Xt =
∫ t
0
ζ(Xs)dWs, P0 − a.s. (2.10)
Example 2.7. Set A0 := [1, 2], A1 := {0} and d = 1. Consider the following specification
b(t, x, a) := 0, σ(t, x, a) := |a0|, g(x) := |x|2, f(t, x, a) :=
∣∣ζ(x)∣∣2 − 2a0ζ(x).
We then have
Xαt =
∫ t
0
|α0s|dWs, P0 − a.s., JS(α) := EP0
[
|XαT |2 −
∫ T
0
[
2α0t ζ(X
α
t )− |ζ(Xαt )|2
]
dt
]
.
Then V
FS
0 = V
FS
0 , but there is no saddle–point in any appropriate sense. To see this, observe that A1S consists
of only the constant process 0, and thus S1 also consists only of the trivial mapping a1 = 0. Then it is clear that
V
FS
0 = V
FS
0 = inf
α0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, 0). (2.11)
This is a standard optimal control problem, and we know its value is v(0, 0), where v is the unique viscosity
solution to the following HJB equation
−∂tv − inf
a0∈A0
{1
2
|a0|2∂2xxv − 2a0ζ(x) + |ζ(x)|2
}
= 0, v(T, x) = x2. (2.12)
One can check straightforwardly that v(t, x) = x2 is the classical solution to the above PDE. In particular,
uniqueness for the last HJB equation follows from the standard verification argument, and this implies that
V
FS
0 = V
FS
0 = sup
α0∈A0
S
JS(α
0, 0) = v(0, 0) = 0. (2.13)
Now assume the game has a saddle–point in some appropriate sense, which will be associated to a certain â0 ∈ A0S
and α̂1 = 0. Then, denoting X̂ := X α̂
0,0
0 = JS(α̂
0, 0) = EP0
[ ∫ T
0
[|α̂0t |2 − 2α̂0t ζ(X̂t) + |ζ(X̂t)|2]dt] = EP0[ ∫ T
0
∣∣α̂0t − ζ(X̂t)∣∣2dt]. (2.14)
This implies that necessarily α̂0 = ζ(Xˆ), P0−a.s. In other words, X̂ must satisfy
X̂t =
∫ t
0
|α̂s|dWs =
∫ t
0
ζ
(
X̂s
)
dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], P0 − a.s.
By Barlow [1], the above SDE has no strong solution, which contradicts with our assumption that X̂ = X α̂
0,0 is
FW−measurable.
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The last example may seem very special, since the game problem is actually reduced to a stochastic control
problem. The following example shows that similar concerns appear in a genuine game problem.
Example 2.8. Set A0 := [1, 2], A1 := [0, 1]. Consider the following specification
b(t, x, a) := 0, σ(t, x, a) := |a0|, g(x) := |x|2, f(t, x, a) :=
∣∣ζ¯(x)∣∣2 − 2a0ζ¯(x), ζ¯ :=√|ζ|2 − 1.
Then Isaacs condition (2.7) holds and
JS(α) = E
P0
[
|XαT |2 −
∫ T
0
[
2α0t ζ¯(X
α
t )− |ζ¯(Xαt )|2
]
dt
]
. (2.15)
In this case, we still have V
FS
0 = V
FS
0 = v(0, 0), where v(t, x) = x
2 + T − t is the unique classical solution to the
following HJBI equation
−∂tv − inf
a0∈A0
{1
2
|a0|2∂2xxv − 2a0ζ¯(x) + |ζ¯(x)|2
}
− sup
a1∈A1
{1
2
|a1|2∂2xxv
}
= 0, v(T, x) = x2. (2.16)
Moreover, the (unique) saddle–point of the Hamiltonian in the sense of (2.8) is
â0 = ζ¯(x), â1 = 1, and thus |â| =
√
|â0|2 + |â1|2 = ζ. (2.17)
Consequently, any natural saddle–point for the game should correspond to these feedback controls. Unfortunately,
similar to the previous example, no strong solution exists under these feedback controls. Since this formulation
is in strong setting, all involved processes should be FW−measurable, so it is very unlikely that a saddle–point
under any reasonable definition will exist for this example.
Remark 2.9. We emphasise that the feedback controls (2.17) can be obtained naturally from the Hamiltonian of
the PDE (provided the PDE has a classical solution). In weak formulation of the game, which will be introduced
soon and will be the main focus of this paper, the saddle–points of the Hamiltonian indeed lead to the saddle
points of the game. However, in strategy against control formulation, saddle–points of the Hamiltonian provide
no clue on the possible saddle–points for the game. This is one of the main drawbacks of this formulation.
2.3 Strong formulation with symmetric delayed pathwise strategies
Recall that the setting in the previous subsection is not symmetric. Cardaliaguet and Rainer [12] have refor-
mulated the game problem by using what they call non–anticipative strategies with delay, thus, formalising the
fact that the players only observe their opponent’s action in the actual state, as well as the path of the result-
ing solution of the stochastic differential equation. Their framework could thus be coined as "strategy against
strategy".
Definition 2.10. Let S0CR be the collection of progressively measurable (deterministic) maps a0 : C0([0, T ],Rd)×
L0([0, T ], A1) −→ L0([0, T ], A0) satisfying the following delay condition
[a0(ω, α1)](t) =
[
a0(ω(t−δ)+∧·, α
1
(t−δ)+∧·)
]
(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.18)
for some δ > 0 independent of (ω, α1), and where for a generic set E, L0([0, T ], E) is the set of Borel measurable
E−valued maps. We define similarly S1CR.
For delayed strategies, the following simple but crucial result holds.
Lemma 2.11. For any (a0, a1) ∈ S0CR × S1CR, there exists unique (α0, α1) ∈ A0S ×A1S such that
α0(ω) = a0(ω, α1(ω)), α1(ω) = a1(ω, α0(ω)), for all ω ∈ Ω (2.19)
Then Cardaliaguet and Rainer [12] define upper and lower values of the game as
V
CR
0 := inf
a0∈S0
CR
sup
a1∈S1
CR
JS(α
0, α1), V CR0 := sup
a1∈S1
CR
inf
a0∈S0
CR
JS(α
0, α1), (2.20)
where (α0, α1) are determined by Lemma 2.11. We emphasise that the mapping from (a0, a1) to (α0, α1) is in
pairs, and it does not necessarily induce a mapping from a0 to α0 (or from a1 to α1). Consequently, the game
values (V
CR
0 , V
CR
0 ) are different from the values (V
S
0 , V
S
0) in (2.2). We also notice that, unlike in (2.9) the upper
value is defined an inf sup, since the setting is symmetric again. The main result of [12] is the following.
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Theorem 2.12. Under appropriate conditions, including the Isaacs condition, we have V
CR
0 = V
CR
0 = v(0, 0),
where v is the unique viscosity solution to the corresponding HJBI equation.
In particular, under the above conditions the game values in [34] and [12] are equal. Notice as well that without
Isaacs condition, [12] establishes a partial comparison principle, implying that v and v are only viscosity semi–
solutions, not necessarily viscosity solutions of the associated HJBI PDE. We remark in addition that this setting
is symmetric and one can naturally define saddle–points (â0, â1). However, the comments in Remark 2.5 (i) and
Remark 2.6 (ii), (iii) remain valid, and no existence result of saddle–points is available in general because of the
delay restriction on the strategies. Notice also that Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [8] have adapted
the BSDE method of Buckdahn and Li [9] to the framework of non–anticipative strategies with delay.
Another way of symmetrising the game problem has been proposed by Fleming and Hernández-Hernández [33].
Building upon the fact that Elliott–Kalton strategies are such that, for instance for the lower value the minimising
player has an advantage in the information available to him at each time, they propose to restrict to so–called
strictly progressively measurable strategies which make this advantage disappear. They then define a notion of
approximate ǫ−saddle–points, but cannot obtain the existence of a saddle–point in the sense we have considered
so far.
2.4 Strong formulation with symmetric feedback controls
The works closest to our present paper are Cardaliaguet and Rainer [11], Pham and Zhang [53], and Sîrbu [58, 59].
Consider the following SDE with feedback controls α : [0, T ]× C0([0, T ],Rd) −→ A
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs, αs(X·))dWs +
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, αs(X·))ds, P0 − a.s. (2.21)
Let Asp denote the set of certain simple feedback controls (meaning controls which are constant or deterministic
in between points of a partition of [0, T ] and/or Ω), in particular so that the above SDE has a unique strong
solution for every admissible control α. We remark that the sets Asp in [11], [53], [58, 59] are not the same,
differing mainly on whether some mixing is allowed in the strategies or not, and on whether stopping times are
allowed in the time–discretisation. The upper and lower game values are then defined as
V
sp
0 := inf
α0∈A0sp
sup
α1∈A1sp
JS
(
α0(X), α1(X)
)
, V sp0 := sup
α1∈A1sp
inf
α0∈A0sp
JS
(
α0(X·), α
1(X·)
)
, (2.22)
where, for α ∈ Asp, X is determined by (2.21). Then we still have
Theorem 2.13. Under appropriate conditions, including the Isaacs condition, we have V
sp
0 = V
sp
0 = v(0, 0),
where v is the unique viscosity solution to the HJBI equation (2.5).
We observe that, in contrast with [11] and [58, 59], the framework of [53] allows for path–dependent dynamics,
and in this case the Isaacs equation becomes a so–called path–dependent PDE, which will be the main tool in
this paper. However, [53] does not allow for x−dependence in the coefficients b and σ, mainly for the purpose
of proving the regularity of the value functions, an issue which becomes very subtle in the present feedback
formulation. In the Markovian setting, this difficulty is remarkably by–passed in [58, 59] by using the notion of
stochastic viscosity solutions of Bayraktar and Sîrbu [3, 4].
We also remark that for feedback controls, it is a lot more convenient to use the so–called weak formulation, under
which the state process X is fixed and the players control its distribution. We finally note that the restriction
to simple feedback controls is a serious obstacle for obtaining a saddle–point. This is the main drawback that
addressed in this paper.
2.5 A complete result in the uncontrolled diffusion setting
The case where the diffusion coefficient σ is not controlled by any of the players has received a lot of attention
since the inception of the study of stochastic differential games, as it allowed for a much simpler treatment.
Hence, using PDE methods in a Markovian setting with feedback controls (though it is not clear whether strong
or weak formulation is considered, see [36, Another remark, p. 85]), Friedman [37, 36] proved existence of an
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equilibrium for an N−players game, as well as existence of a value and a saddle–point for two–players zero–sum
games. Using the martingale approach of Davis and Varaiya [16] for stochastic control problems, a version of
the problem in weak formulation was then considered by Elliott [25, 26], and Elliott and Davis [27], allowing
in particular for non–Markovian dynamics. Their approach was subsequently streamlined and simplified by
Hamadène and Lepeltier [39, 38] and Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng [40] using BSDEs methods.
Since their approach is close in spirit to the one we wish to follow, we dedicate this section to describing it.
Consider the following drift–less SDE
Xt =
∫ t
0
σs(X·)dWs, P0 − a.s. (2.23)
where σ : [0, T ] × C0([0, T ],Rd) −→ Sd is progressively measurable, bounded, non–degenerate, and uniformly
Lipschitz in x. Hence, the above SDE has a unique strong solution, and X and W generate the same filtration.
We next introduce a progressively measurable bounded map λ : [0, T ]×C0([0, T ],Rd)×A −→ Rd, together with
the equivalent probability measures
dPα
dP0
:= exp
(∫ T
0
λt
(
X·, αt(X·)
) · dWt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt
(
X·, αt(X·)
)|2dt) for all α ∈ AHL, (2.24)
whereAHL is the set of admissible controls, for which the above probability measure is well–defined. By Girsanov’s
theorem, the process Wα :=W − ∫ ·0 λt(X·, αt(X·))dt is an Pα−Brownian motion, and (Pα, X) is a weak solution
of the drift–controlled SDE
Xt =
∫ t
0
bs(X·, αs(X·))ds+
∫ t
0
σs(X·)dW
α
s , P
α − a.s., where b := σλ. (2.25)
The upper and lower values of the game are then defined by
V
HL
0 := inf
α0∈A0
HL
sup
α1∈A1
HL
JW(α
0, α1), V HL0 := sup
α1∈A1
HL
inf
α0∈A0
HL
JW(α
0, α1), where JW(α) := E
P
α
[
ξ +
∫ T
0
ft(, αt)dt
]
,
for some appropriate functions f : [0, T ] × C0([0, T ],Rd) × A −→ R and ξ : C0([0, T ],Rd) −→ R. We finally
introduce
F t(x, z) := inf
a0∈A0
sup
a1∈A1
{
bt(x, a) · z + ft(x, a)
}
and F t(x, z) := sup
a1∈A1
inf
a0∈A0
{
bt(x, a) · z + ft(x, a)
}
,
where as usual a = (a0, a1). Notice that, by extending the Hamiltonians (2.6) to the path dependent case in the
obvious way, we have the correspondence
H = F +
1
2
Tr[σ2γ], and H = F +
1
2
Tr[σ2γ].
The main result of [39] is the following.
Theorem 2.14. Under appropriate conditions, including Isaacs’s condition F = F =: F , we have V
HL
0 = V
HL
0 =
Y0, where (Y, Z) is the unique solution to the backward SDE
dYt = −Ft(X·, Zt)dt+ Zt · dXt, and YT = ξ(X·), P0 − a.s. (2.26)
Moreover, any saddle–point of F induces a saddle–point of the game.
The following example shows that the framework of [39] allows to obtain a saddle–point of a game in typical
situations where all the previous frameworks of this section fail.
Example 2.15. Consider the setting in Example 2.1 with c = 1, ρ = 0, except that X = (X1, X2) should be
viewed as weak solution of the following SDE
X1t =
∫ t
0
α0s(X
1
· , X
2
· )ds+W
1,α
t , X
2
t =
∫ t
0
α1s(X
1
· , X
2
· )ds+W
2,α
t .
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Note that, unlike in Example 2.1, here X1 and X2 depend on both α0 and α1. In this case, we have
F t(z) = F t(z) = Ft(z) = inf
|a0|≤1
{a0z1}+ sup
|a1|≤1
{a1z2} = −|z1|+ |z2|,
and the unique saddle–point of F is given by
â0(z) := −sgn(z1), â1(z) := sgn(z2).
Notice that since σ is the identity matrix here, we have X = W and the BSDE (2.26) becomes
Yt =
∣∣X1T −X2T ∣∣2 + ∫ T
t
(|Z2s | − |Z1s |)ds− ∫ T
t
Zs · dXs, P0 − a.s.
In fact, one may verify straightforwardly that the solution to the above BSDE is
Yt :=
∣∣X1t −X2t ∣∣2 + 2(T − t), Z1t := 2(X1t −X2t ), Z2t = 2(X2t −X1t ).
Consequently, the game value is Y0 = 2T and the saddle–point of the game is given by
α̂0t := −sgn(Z1t ) = −sgn
(
X1t −X2t
)
, α̂1t := sgn(Z
2
t ) = sgn
(
X2t −X1t
)
.
Our objective of this paper is to extend Theorem 2.14 to a controlled (possibly degenerate) diffusion frame-
work. Again we shall use weak formulation and our main tool will be path dependent PDEs, whose semi–linear
counterpart is exactly the backward SDE. In particular, our results will provide a complete characterisations of
Examples 2.7 and 2.8, once reformulated in the setting of weak solutions, as well as the degenerate situation of
Example 2.15 (namely |ρ| = 1). As will become clearer later, the assumptions on the coefficients we will require
are slightly stronger than in the recent work of Zhang [69, 70], but the latter considers the strong formulation
with strategy against control and thus cannot obtain any positive results towards existence of saddle–points. The
weak formulation allows to do so, but at the price of more stringent assumptions on the coefficients.
3 Main results
3.1 Path dependent game in weak formulation
The canonical space Ω := {ω ∈ C([0, T ];Rd) : ω0 = 0} is endowed with the L∞−norm. The corresponding
canonical process X induces the natural filtration F. The time space set Θ := [0, T ] × Ω is equipped with the
pseudo-distance d∞((t, ω), (t
′, ω′)) := |t− t′|+ ‖ω∧t − ω′∧t′‖∞.
The set of control processes A := A0 × A1 consists of all F−progressively measurable A−valued processes, for
some subset A := A0 × A1 of a finite dimensional space. For all α ∈ A, we denote by P(α) the set of weak
solutions of the following path–dependent SDE
Xt =
∫ t
0
bs(X·, αs(X·))ds+
∫ t
0
σs(X·, αs(X·))dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.1)
where b : Θ×A −→ Rd, σ : Θ×A −→ Sd satisfies the conditions in Assumption 3.1 below. Here, for simplicity,
we assume that X and W have the same dimension d and σ is symmetric, but the extension to the more general
situation is straightfroward. Equivalently, any P ∈ P(α) is a probability measure on the canonical space Ω which
solves the following martingale problem
Mαt := Xt −
∫ t
0
bs(αs)ds is a P−martingale, with 〈Mα〉t =
∫ t
0
σ2s (αs)ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P− a.s. (3.2)
Here we take the notational convention that, by putting the time variable s as subscript, we mean bs, σs, αs
depend on X , but we often omit X itself for notational simplicity. Notice that in general, the set P(α) for an
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arbitrary α ∈ A may be empty. We thus introduce the following subset A := A0 ×A1, where3
Ai := {αi ∈ Ai : P(αi) 6= ∅}, where P(αi) := ⋃
α1−i∈A
1−i
P(α0, α1), i = 0, 1. (3.3)
For an FT−measurable random variable ξ and an F−progressively measurable f : Θ×A −→ R, we now define
J0(α,P) := E
P
[
ξ +
∫ T
0
fs(αs)ds
]
, J0(α) := sup
P∈P(α)
J0(α,P), and J0(α) := inf
P∈P(α)
J0(α,P), (3.4)
with the convention that sup ∅ := −∞ and inf ∅ :=∞. The upper and lower values of the game are then
V 0 := inf
α0∈A0
sup
α1∈A1
J0(α), and V 0 := sup
α1∈A1
inf
α0∈A0
J0(α). (3.5)
Notice that the inequality ∞ ≥ V 0 ≥ V 0 ≥ −∞ always holds.
Assumption 3.1. (i) b, σ, and f are bounded, F−progressively measurable in all variables, and uniformly
continuous in (t, ω) under d∞, uniformly in a ∈ A.
(ii) ξ is bounded and uniformly continuous in ω.
We remark that we allow σ to be degenerate. Under the assumptions on b and σ, the sets A1 and A2 are not
empty, as they contain constant and even piecewise constant controls. The remaining conditions on f and ξ
guarantee that J0 is finite. We emphasise that the boundedness assumption may be relaxed to linear growth.
Definition 3.2. The game value exists if V 0 = V 0. A control α̂ = (α̂
0, α̂1) ∈ A is a saddle–point of the game if
J0(α̂
0, α1) ≤ J0(α̂) = V 0 = V 0 = J0(α̂) ≤ J0(α0, α̂1), for all (α0, α1) ∈ A. (3.6)
We remark that, if α̂ is a saddle–point, then P(α̂) 6= ∅ and J0(α̂,P) = V 0 = V 0 for all P ∈ P(α̂). We conclude
this subsection with a generic result concerning saddle–points. Denote
J0(α
0) := sup
α1∈A1
J0(α
0, α1), and J0(α
1) := inf
α0∈A0
J0(α
0, α1). (3.7)
Then the game problems in (3.5) can be rewritten
V 0 = inf
α0∈A0
J0(α
0) and V 0 = sup
α1∈A1
J0(α
1). (3.8)
Proposition 3.3. Assume the game value exists. Then α̂ ∈ A is a saddle–point of the game if and only if α̂0
and α̂1 are optimal controls of V 0 and V 0 in (3.8), respectively.
The proof is omitted as it follows directly from Definition 3.2. We shall see that the existence of the game
value will typically follow from the uniqueness of the viscosity solution to the corresponding HJBI equation.
By Proposition 3.3, it seems that the existence of saddle–points is then reduced to two standard optimisation
problems. However, we emphasise that, due to the weak formulation or more specifically our choice of feedback
controls, the mappings α0 ∈ A0 7−→ J0(α0) and α1 ∈ A1 7−→ J0(α1) are typically not continuous. Even worse, it
is not clear what is the appropriate topology for the sets A0 and A1, and whether they do have the appropriate
topological requirements. Therefore, the optimisation problems in (3.8) are actually real challenges.
3The idea here is that if there existed α0,⋆ ∈ A
0
such that P(α0,⋆, α1) = ∅ for any α1 ∈ A
1
, then obviously in the upper value
Player 0 will play α0,⋆, since then whatever the choice of Player 1 afterwards will lead to a value of −∞. Similarly, if there existed
α1,⋆ ∈ A
1
such that P(α0, α1,⋆) = ∅ for any α0 ∈ A
0
, in the lower value Player 1 will play α1,⋆, since then whatever the choice of
Player 0 afterwards will lead to a value of +∞. Our restriction is here merely to prevent this obvious degeneracy.
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3.2 Path-dependent HJBI characterisation
Similar to the Markovian case, we shall use path–dependent PDEs as a powerful tool to study the present
path–dependent differential games. For a = (a0, a1) ∈ A, similar to (2.6) we define
ht(ω, z, γ, a) :=
1
2
Tr
[
σ2t (ω, a)γ
]
+ bt(ω, a) · z + ft(ω, a),
Ht := inf
a0∈A0
sup
a1∈A1
ht(., a0, a1), Ht := sup
a1∈A1
inf
a0∈A0
ht(., a0, a1).
(3.9)
Our main result requires the standard Isaacs condition
H = H =: H. (3.10)
To prove existence of the game value, we shall use the viscosity theory of path–dependent PDEs (PPDE hereafter).
Let C0(Θ,R) denote the set of functions u : Θ −→ R continuous under d∞, C0b (Θ,R) the subset of bounded
functions, and UCb(Θ,R) the subset of uniformly continuous functions. For any L > 0, PL denotes the set of
semimartingale measures on Ω such that the drift and diffusion of X are bounded by L and
√
2L, respectively,
and P∞ := ∪L>0PL. For any t ∈ [0, T ], let Tt denote the set of F−stopping times smaller than t. For a generic
measurable set E, we also denote by L0(Θ, E) the set of F−progressively measurable E−valued functions. For
any subset P of P∞, we say that a property holds P−q.s. if it holds P−a.s. for any P ∈ P .
For θ = (t, ω) ∈ Θ and ω′ ∈ Ω, define
(ω⊗t ω′)s := ωs1[0,t]+(ωt+ω′s−t−ω′0)1(t,T ](s), ζθ(ω′) := ζ(ω⊗t ω′), and ηθs (ω′) := ηt+s(ω⊗t ω′), s ∈ [0, T − t],
for an FT−measurable random variable ζ, and an F−measurable process {ηs, s ∈ [0, T ]}. We observe in particular
that ζθ is FT−t−measurable, and the process ηθ is F−adapted. Finally, for ǫ > 0, we introduce the stopping
time hǫ(ω) := inf
{
t : d∞((t, ω), (0, 0)) ≥ ǫ
} ∧ T .
For u ∈ C0(Θ,R) and θ := (t, ω) ∈ Θ, the super and sub–jets are defined by the subsets of R× Rd × Sd:
J Lu(θ) :=
{
(κ, z, γ) : −u(θ) = sup
P∈PL
sup
τ∈Thǫ
E
P
[
κτ + qz,γ(Xτ )− uθτ
]
, for some ǫ > 0
}
,
J Lu(θ) :=
{
(κ, z, γ) : −u(θ) = inf
P∈PL
inf
τ∈Thǫ
E
P
[
κτ + qz,γ(Xτ )− uθτ
]
, for some ǫ > 0
}
.
(3.11)
where we used the notation qz,γ(x) := z · x + 12Tr
[
γxx⊤
]
, for all (x, z, γ) ∈ Rd × Rd × Sd. Now consider the
following PPDE with generator G : Θ× R× Rd × Sd −→ R
−∂tut(ω)−Gt(ω, u, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) = 0. (3.12)
The appropriate notion of path–derivatives in the above equation has been proposed first by Dupire [17], and
consists essentially in a directional derivative with respect to perturbations of the last value taken by the path.
Since we are only interested in viscosity solutions, we do not need to detail this any further.
Definition 3.4. Let u ∈ C0(Θ,R).
(i) For any L > 0, we say u is a PL−viscosity super–solution (resp. sub–solution) of PPDE (3.12) if, for any
θ ∈ Θ and any (κ, z, γ) ∈ J Lu(θ) (resp. in J Lu(θ)), it holds that
−κ−Gt(ω, ut(ω), z, γ) ≥ (resp. ≤) 0.
(ii) u is a PL−viscosity solution of PPDE (3.12) if it is both a PL−viscosity super and sub–solution of (3.12).
Moreover, u is a P∞−viscosity solution of PPDE (3.12) if it is an PL−viscosity solution for some L > 0.
We remark that in our weak formulation setting (or more precisely due to the feedback type of controls), the
regularity of the game value is a very subtle question. As will be explained later on in the paper, our main need
for a priori regularity is linked to our proof of the dynamic programming principle. This is in stark contrast
with the usual control theory, for which proving dynamic programming in weak formulation requires merely to
assume proper measurability of the coefficients, see for instance the recent papers by El Karoui and Tan [22, 23].
Proving regularity in a strong formulation framework, either in the strategy against control setting or the delayed
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strategies one of Section 2, is usually simply a matter of obtaining appropriate estimates on the moments of the
controlled diffusion, which does not pose any specific problem in general. However in weak formulation, the fact
that the players are controlling the distribution of X makes matters much worse. Once again, this is the price
to pay if one wishes to obtain general existence results for saddle–points, as shown in our previous examples.
In order to bypass this difficulty and for the sake of clarity, we consider in this subsection a special case which is
easier to deal with. A more general case will be studied in Section 5 below.
Assumption 3.5. b = b(t, a) and σ = σ(t, a) are independent of ω.
Our first main result is the following. The proof is postponed to the next section.
Theorem 3.6. Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.5, and Isaacs’s condition (3.10) hold. Then
(i) The following path dependent Isaacs equation has a viscosity solution u ∈ UCb(Θ,R)
−∂tu−Ht(ω, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) = 0, t < T, uT = ξ. (3.13)
(ii) Assume further that this PPDE has a unique viscosity solution in UCb(Θ,R). Then V 0 = V 0 = u0(0).
Remark 3.7. (i) The uniqueness of viscosity solution is a highly nontrivial issue. In Ekren, Touzi and Zhang
[19] and Pham and Zhang [53], uniqueness was proved only in the case where σ is uniformly non–degenerate and
the dimension d is either 1 or 2.
(ii) If one can prove the existence of viscosity solution in a smaller class C ⊂ C(Θ,R) (or more precisely show
that the dynamic upper and lower value processes of the game are in C), then it is actually enough to prove
the uniqueness of viscosity solution in the class C. Hence, Ren,Touzi and Zhang [55] proved the existence and
uniqueness in a subclass of UCb(Θ,R), under slightly stronger regularity assumptions on ξ and f in terms of ω.
Using their result provides us with the existence of the game value, even when σ is degenerate or d ≥ 3.
(iii) Notice however that [55] requires that b and σ are independent of ω. On the other hand, Ekren and Zhang
[20] have introduced a different type of viscosity solution called pseudo–Markovian viscosity solutions, and proved
the corresponding uniqueness under weaker conditions. This will be interesting for us when we extend our game
problem to path dependent (b, σ) in Section 5 below.
(iv) Finally, in the Markovian case, we can replace our uniqueness assumption with the uniqueness in the standard
Crandall–Lions notion of viscosity solutions. However, notice that our uniqueness assumption is always weaker.
3.3 A verification result
In this subsection we establish the existence of a saddle–point under the stronger condition that the Isaacs
equation (3.13) has additional regularity inspired from the W 1,2−Sobolev solutions in the PDE literature. We
emphasise that in this subsection we do not require Assumption 3.5 to hold. This is to be expected as already
in standard stochastic control problems, verification–type arguments do not require to prove beforehand the
dynamic programming principle, which, once more, is the only result which requires regularity of the value
function. Note that
d〈X〉t =: σ̂2t dt, holds P∞ − q.s., (3.14)
and can be defined without reference to a specific measure in P∞ by classical results of Bichteler [5].
Definition 3.8. Let u ∈ L0(Θ,R) and P ⊂ P∞. We say that u ∈ W 1,2loc (P) if
(i) u is a uniformly integrable semimartinagle under any P ∈ P;
(ii) for some measurable processes ∂tu, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu valued in R,R
d, and Sd, u has the decomposition
dut = ∂tut dt+ ∂ωut · dXt + 1
2
Tr
[
∂2ωωut d〈X〉t
]
, P − q.s., (3.15)
with
∫ T
0
(∣∣∣∂tut + 12Tr[∂2ωωutσ̂2t ]∣∣∣+ |∂ωut|2)dt <∞, P−q.s.
Remark 3.9. (i) By definition, any u ∈ W 1,2loc (P) is continuous in t, P−q.s. However, unlike in Dupire [17] or
in Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [18, 19], we do not require pointwise continuity in ω. In particular, this relaxation
will allow us to cover BSDEs and 2BSDEs with measurable coefficients.
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(ii) Clearly, (3.15) is closely related to the functional Itô formula in [17, 18, 19]. However, our requirements here
are weaker. In particular, we do not require the uniqueness of ∂tu and ∂2ωωu.
(iii) One can easily see that ∂ωu is unique d〈X〉t × dP−a.s., and ∂tut + 12Tr[σ̂2t ∂2ωωut] is unique dt × dP−a.s.,
for all P ∈ P. If we set P = PL for some L > 0, and require ∂tut and ∂2ωωut to be PL−q.s. continuous, then it
follows from Song [62] that ∂tu and ∂2ωωu are unique in the PL−q.s. sense. This additional quasi–sure continuity
requirement leads to the G−Sobolev space W 1,2G introduced by Peng and Song [51].
Theorem 3.10. Let Assumption 3.1 and Isaacs’s condition (3.10) hold. Assume further that
(i) The PPDE (3.13) has a W 1,2loc (P)−solution u, where P := ∪α∈AP(α). In other words, there exist, not
necessarily unique, (∂tu, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) satisfying (3.15) and
−∂tu−Ht(∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) = 0, P − q.s. (3.16)
(ii) The Hamiltonian Ht(ω, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) has a measurable saddle–point α̂t(ω), such that P − q.s.
ht(∂ωu, ∂
2
ωωu, α̂
0
t , a1) ≤ ht(∂ωu, ∂2ωωu, α̂0t , α̂1t ) = Ht(∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) ≤ ht(∂ωu, ∂2ωωu, a0, α̂1t ), for all a ∈ A. (3.17)
(iii) The set P(α̂) is not empty.
Then V 0 = u0 = V 0 and α̂ is a saddle–point of the game.
Proof. For any α0 ∈ A0, and P ∈ P(α0, α̂1), it follows from (3.15) and (3.16) that, P− a.s.
dut =
(
bt(α
0
t , α̂
1
t )·∂ωu+
1
2
Tr
[
σ2t (α
0
t , α̂
1
t )∂
2
ωωu
]−Ht(∂ωu, ∂2ωωu))dt+∂ωu·dMα0,α̂1t ≥ −ft(α0t , αˆ1t )dt+∂ωu·dMα0,α̂1t .
Recall the integrability condition in Definition 3.8 (ii), and denote τn := T ∧ inf
{
t :
∫ t
0
(|∂tus + 12Tr[∂2ωωusσˆ2s ]|+
|∂ωus|2)ds ≥ n
}
, so that limn→∞ P[τn = T ] = 1. As σ̂
2
t = σ
2
t (α
0
t , α̂
1
t ), P−a.s. we see by integrating and taking
expectations above that u0 ≤ EP
[
uτn +
∫ τn
0
ft(α
0
t , αˆ
1
t )dt
]
. Send now n −→ ∞, since u is continuous in t and
uniformly integrable under P, we obtain from the dominated convergence theorem under P that
J0(α
0, α̂1,P) = EP
[
ξ +
∫ T
0
ft(α
0
t , α̂
1
t )dt
]
≥ u0.
Following similar arguments, for any α0 ∈ A0, α1 ∈ A1, P0 ∈ P(α0, α̂1), P1 ∈ P(α̂0, α1), P̂ ∈ P(α̂), we obtain
J0(α̂
0, α1,P1) ≤ u0 = J0(α̂, P̂) ≤ J0(α0, α̂1,P0).
This implies immediately that V 0 = u0 = V 0 and α̂ is a saddle–point of the game.
Remark 3.11. Notice that in Theorem 3.10 (iii), we do not require P(α̂) to be a singleton. When it consists of
several measures P, the value J0(α̂,P) is actually independent of the choice of P.
Remark 3.12. In the Markovian case, it is not enough to assume that the PDE has a Sobolev solution u in the
standard W 1,2−space. Indeed, consider the first inequality of (3.17) in that setting
h(t, x,Du,D2u, α̂0(t, x), a1) ≤ H(t, x,Du,D2u), (t, x) /∈ N, (3.18)
where N is an appropriate set with Lebesgue measure 0 on [0, T ]×Rd. When σ is uniformly elliptic, the generalised
Itô formula of Krylov [45, Theorem 2.10.1] allows to conclude as usual. However, in the degenerate case, equality
fails to hold in general, see [45, Theorem 2.10.2], which means that (3.18) does not imply that the corresponding
inequality in (3.17) holds P−a.s. so that the arguments in Theorem 3.10 would fail. In other words, even in
the Markovian setting, with degenerate volatility, our quasi–sure characterisation of the Sobolev solution and the
saddle–points of the Hamiltonian seems necessary for the verification arguments.
A saddle–point exists under our formulation in the following examples. We emphasise that none of the formula-
tions in the existing literature allows to handle these examples, see Section 2.
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Example 3.13. Compare to Example 2.8. Set A0 := [1, 2], A1 := [0, 1], d := 1, b := 0, σt(a) := |a0|,
ft(a) := ζ(ωt)− 2a0ζ(ωt), ξ(ω) := |ωT |2. That is, P(α) consists of weak solutions of
Xt =
∫ t
0
|α0s(X·)|dWs, and J0(α,P) := EP
[
|XT |2 −
∫ T
0
[
2α0t ζ¯(Xt)− |ζ¯(Xt)|2
]
dt
]
. (3.19)
We remark that f and ξ here violate the boundedness assumption in Assumption 3.1. However, this condition is
mainly for the convenience of the general path dependent PDEs, and in this particular example, it is not needed.
Nevertheless, in this case, we have V 0 = V 0 = v(0, 0), where v(t, x) = x
2 + T − t is the classical solution to the
HJBI equation (3.13). Again, the (unique) saddle–point of the Hamiltonian in the sense of (3.17) is provided by
(2.17). Define α̂t(ω) := ât(ωt). Then |α̂t(ω)| = ζ(ωt) and thus (3.19) becomes (2.10). By Barlow [1], P(αˆ) is a
singleton. This implies easily that α̂ is indeed a saddle–point of the game.
The next example extends Example 2.15 to the degenerate case, namely c = 0 or |ρ| = 1. We remark that the
result of Hamadène and Lepeltier [39] does not apply in this case.
Example 3.14. Consider the setting of Example 2.15, but with c = 0 or |ρ| = 1.
(i) Let ρ = 1 and c > 0; the case ρ = −1 can be treated similarly. The HJBI equation reduces to
−∂tv − 1
2
c2
(
∂x1x1v + ∂x2x2v + 2∂x1x2v
)
+ |∂x1v| − |∂x2v| = 0, v(T, x1, x2) = |x1 − x2|2,
which has a classical solution v(t, x1, x2) = |x1 − x2|2. The saddle–points for the Hamiltonian are then given by
â0(t, x) := −sgn(x1 − x2)− β1(t, x)1{x1=x2}, â1(t, x) := sgn(x2 − x1) + β2(t, x)1{x1=x2},
for any arbitrary measurable functions β1, β2 taking values in [−1, 1]. Denote DX := X2−X1. In order to prove
that the two–dimensional SDE X it =
∫ t
0
(
sgn(DXs)− β1(s,Xs)1{DXs=0}
)
ds+ cWt, i = 0, 1, has a weak solution,
we observe that the difference satisfies the ODE DXt =
∫ t
0 (β1 + β2)(s,Xs)1{DXs=0}ds, which has a solution if
and only if β1 + β2 = 0. In this case, the unique solution is DXt = 0, i.e. X1 = X0, and we are reduced to the
ODE X0t =
∫ t
0 β1(s,X
0
s , X
0
s )ds + cWt, which also has a unique weak solution since c > 0 and β1 is bounded by
definition. Therefore, the saddle–points of the game are
α̂0t = α̂
1
t = sgn(X
1
t −X0t ) + β(t,X0t )1{X0t=X1t }, for an arbitrary measurable β : [0, T ]× R −→ [−1, 1].
(ii) When c = 0, the last characterisation of the saddle–point still holds true provided that the ODE X0t =∫ t
0
β(s,X0s )ds has a solution.
In the rest of this section, we investigate the question of existence of weak solutions for path–dependent SDEs,
thus providing sufficient conditions for Theorem 3.10 (iii). In the Markovian setting, we refer to Krylov [45,
Section 2.6] for existence of weak solutions of SDEs with measurable coefficients. We emphasise again that
uniqueness is not required in our approach.
Definition 3.15. An F−mesurable process ϕ, with values in an Euclidean space, is called P−q.s. continuous if,
for any ǫ > 0, there exist closed subsets {Ωǫt}0≤t≤T ⊂ Ω such that
(i) the process 1Ωǫt is F−progressively measurable with supP∈P EP
[ ∫ T
0 1(Ω
ǫ
t)
cdt
]
≤ ǫ.
(ii) For each t, ϕ(t, ·) is continuous in Ωǫt.
The following existence result looks standard and its proof is postponed to the Appendix Section 7.
Theorem 3.16. Assume b : Θ −→ Rd and σ : Θ −→ Sd are bounded by a certain constant L, are F−measurable,
and PL−q.s. continuous. Then there is a weak solution to the SDE Xt =
∫ t
0 b(s,X·)ds+
∫ t
0 σ(s,X·)dWs.
We finally discuss the desired regularity for saddle–points of the Hamiltonian, for which we define W 1,2(P) as
the subset of W 1,2loc (P) consisting of processes u such that ∂tu, ∂ωu, and ∂2ωωu are P−q.s. continuous.
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Theorem 3.17. Let Assumption 3.1 holds, b, σ continuous in a, and assume further the Isaacs condition (3.10)
holds with saddle-point α̂t(ω, z, γ)
ht(ω, z, γ, α̂
0
t , a1) ≤ ht(ω, z, γ, α̂0t , α̂1t ) = Ht(ω, z, γ) ≤ ht(ω, z, γ, a0, α̂1t ), for all a ∈ A, P − a.s.,
such that α̂ is continuous in (z, γ), and uniformly P−continuous in (t, ω), i.e. α̂(·, z, γ) is P−continuous for all
(z, γ), with a common {Ωǫt}0≤t≤T for all (z, γ).
Let u be a W 1,2(P)−solution of the PPDE (3.13) with P := ∪α∈AP(α). Then V 0 = u0 = V 0 and α∗t (ω) :=
α̂t
(
ω, ∂ωu(t, ω), ∂
2
ωωu(t, ω)
)
is a saddle-point of the game.
Proof. By our regularity assumptions on u and α̂, we see that α∗t (ω) := α̂t
(
ω, ∂ωu(t, ω), ∂
2
ωωu(t, ω)
)
is P−q.s.
continuous. Together with the continuity of b and σ in a, this implies that b̂(t, ω) := bt(ω, α
∗
t (ω)) and σ̂(t, ω) :=
σt(ω, α
∗
t (ω)) are also P−q.s. continuous. Now it follows from Theorem 3.16 that P(α∗) 6= ∅. Therefore, we can
apply Theorem 3.10 to conclude.
3.4 Second order backward SDE characterisation
For α0 ∈ A0 fixed, The stochastic control problem J0(α0), defined in (3.7), can be characterized by the corre-
sponding second order BSDEs, as introduced by Cheridito, Soner, Touzi and Victoir [13], and further developed
by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [61] and Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [54].
3.4.1 The general case
We emphasise that in this subsection, we do not require Assumption 3.5 to hold.
Assumption 3.18. (i) b = σλ for some λ : Θ×A→ Rd progressively measurable and bounded.
(ii) For every (t, ω) ∈ Θ and a = (a0, a1) ∈ A, the following two sets are convex{
(b, σ, f)(t, ω, a′0, a1) : a
′
0 ∈ A0
}
,
{
(b, σ, f)(t, ω, a0, a
′
1) : a
′
0 ∈ A1
}
.
Assumption 3.18 (i) is made in order to focus on the main arguments, and can be relaxed at the price of more
technical developments highlight more our core ideas. Assumption 3.18 (ii) is mainly technical, and will be
explained in the proof of Lemma 6.1 below.
Recall A, P(α), and (3.3) from Subsection 3.1. We introduce the corresponding terms when b = 0
P0(α) :=
{
P : X. =
∫ .
0
σs
(
X·, α(X·)
)
dWs, P− a.s.
}
, P00 (α1) :=
⋃
α0∈A
0
P0(α), P10 (α0) :=
⋃
α1∈A
1
P0(α),
A00 =
{
α0 ∈ A0 : P10 (α0) 6= ∅
}
, A10 :=
{
α1 ∈ A1 : P00 (α1) 6= ∅
}
, A0 := A00 ×A10. (3.20)
For every pair (α,P) ∈ A0 × P0(α), let W P,α be an P−Brownian motion corresponding to the driftless SDE in
the definition of P0(α). For λ satisfying Assumption 3.18 (i), we denote λα := λ
(
X·, α(X·)
)
, and we introduce
an equivalent measure Pα, together with the corresponding Brownian motion (by Girsanov theorem):
dPα
dP
:= exp
(∫ T
0
λαs · dW P,αs −
1
2
∫ T
0
∣∣λαs ∣∣2ds), and W Pα := W P,α − ∫ .
0
λαs ds,
so that the dynamics of the canonical process under Pα are given by:
dXs = bs
(
X·, αs(X·)
)
ds+ σs
(
X·, α(X·)
)
dW P
α
s , P
α − a.s.
The upper and lower values of the game can then be rewritten as
V
0
0 := inf
α0∈A00
sup
α1∈A10
J0(α), and V
0
0 := sup
α1∈A10
inf
α0∈A00
J0(α),
where J0(α) := sup
P∈P0(α)
E
P
α
[
ξ +
∫ T
0
fs(αs)ds
]
, J0(α) := inf
P∈P0(α)
E
P
α
[
ξ +
∫ T
0
fs(αs)ds
]
.
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We next introduce the nonlinear generators
F t(ω, z, a0) := sup
a1∈A1(t,ω,a0)
Ft(ω, z, a0, a1), and F t(ω, z, a1) := inf
a0∈A0(t,ω,a1)
Ft(ω, z, a0, a1), (3.21)
where, for the σ̂ defined in (3.14),
Ft(ω, z, a) := bt(ω, a) · z + ft(ω, a), and Ai(t, ω, a1−i) :=
{
ai ∈ Ai :
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(ω, a0, a1) = σ̂
2
t (ω)
}
, i = 0, 1.
The second order backward SDEs (2BSDE, hereafter) which will serve to represent the upper and lower values
is defined by the following representation of the r.v. ξ 4:
Y α
1
t = ξ +
∫ T
t
F s
(
Zα
1
s , α
1
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zα
1
s · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKα
1
s , P− a.s., for all P ∈ P00 (α1), (3.22)
Y
α0
t = ξ +
∫ T
t
F s
(
Z
α0
s , α
0
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Z
α0
s · dXs +
∫ T
t
dK
α0
s , P− a.s., for all P ∈ P10 (α0). (3.23)
Definition 3.19. We say that (Y α
1
, Zα
1
) is a solution of the 2BSDE (3.22) if, for some p > 1,
(i) Y α
1
is a càdlàg and FP
0
0 (α
1)+−optional process, with ‖Y α1‖p
D0p
:= sup
P∈P00 (α
1) E
P
[
supt≤T |Y α
1
t |p
]
<∞.
(ii) Zα
1
is an FP
0
0 (α
1)−predictable process, with ‖Zα1‖p
H0p
:= sup
P∈P0
0
(α1) E
P
[( ∫ T
0
(Zα
1
t )
⊤σ̂2tZ
α1
t dt
) p
2
]
<∞.
(iii) For all P ∈ P00 (α1), the process
Kα
1,P
t := Y
α1
t − Y α
1
0 +
∫ t
0
F s
(
Zα
1
s , α
1
s
)
ds−
∫ t
0
Zα
1
s · dXs, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.24)
is P−optional, non–decreasing, and satisfies the minimality condition:
Kα
1,P
t = essinf
P
P′∈P00 (α
1;t,P,F+)
E
P
′[
Kα
1,P′
T
∣∣FP+t ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P− a.s., (3.25)
where P00 (α1; t,P,F+) :=
{
P′ ∈ P00 (α1) : P[E] = P′[E] for all E ∈ F+t
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
The solution (Y
α0
, Z
α0
) of the 2BSDE (3.23) is defined similarly.
We are now ready for the main result of this subsection, the proof is postponed to Section 6 below.
Theorem 3.20. (i) Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.18, the 2BSDEs (3.22) and (3.23) have unique solutions, with
V 0 := inf
α0∈A00
sup
P∈P10 (α
0)
E
P
α
[
Y
α0
0
]
, and V 0 := sup
α1∈A10
inf
P∈P00(α
1)
E
P
α
[
Y α
1
0
]
;
(ii) If in addition, for some α̂ = (α̂0, α̂1) ∈ A0, and P̂ ∈ P0(α̂),
F s
(
Zα̂
1
s , α̂
1
s
)
= F s
(
Z
α̂0
s , α̂
0
s
)
, ds⊗ dP̂− a.e., and K α̂
0
T = K
α̂1
T = 0, P̂− a.s. (3.26)
then the game value exists, i.e. V 0 = V 0, and α̂ is a saddle–point of the game.
We notice that Theorem 3.20 does not require Assumption 3.5. Moreover, Theorem 3.20 (ii) does not require
(3.10) directly. However, the conditions in (3.26) are rather strong, and essentially imply (3.10), see Remark 6.2
below for more details.
4We remark that 2BSDEs (3.22) and (3.23) do not include an orthogonal martingale term, even though the involved probabilities
P may not satisfy the predictable martingale representation property. Here we will use the so called optional decomposition rather
than the Doob-Meyer one to obtain the processes Kα
1
and K
α0
, see the notion of "saturated" solutions of 2BSDEs in Possamaï,
Tan and Zhou [54].
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3.4.2 A simpler case: volatility controlled by one player only
In this subsection we improve Theorem 3.20 when only one player, say Player 0, controls the volatility, i.e.
σt(ω, a) = σt(ω, a0).
5 Then, (3.9) reduces to
Ht(z, γ) = inf
Σ∈Σt
{1
2
Tr
[
Σγ
]
+Gt(z,Σ)
}
, Ht(z, γ) = sup
a1∈A1
inf
Σ∈Σt
{1
2
Tr
[
Σγ
]
+ g
t
(z,Σ, a1)
}
, where
Σt(a0) :=
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(a0), Σt :=
{
Σt(a0), a0 ∈ A0
}
, A0(t,Σ) :=
{
a0 ∈ A0 :
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(a0) = Σ
}
, (3.27)
Gt(z,Σ) := inf
a0∈A0(t,Σ)
sup
a1∈A1
Ft(z, a0, a1), gt(z,Σ, a1) := infa0∈A0(t,Σ)
Ft(z, a0, a1), Gt(z,Σ) := sup
a1∈A1
g
t
(z,Σ, a1).
Moreover, it is clear that P0(α) = P10 (α0) =: P0(α0) depends only on α0. Denote P0 := ∪α0∈A0P0(α0). We now
introduce the following 2BSDEs with solutions defined similarly to Definition 3.19.
Y t = ξ +
∫ T
t
Gs
(
Zs, σ̂
2
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zs · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKs, P− a.s., for all P ∈ P0, (3.28)
Y t = ξ +
∫ T
t
Gs
(
Zs, σ̂
2
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zs · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKs, P− a.s., for all P ∈ P0. (3.29)
Theorem 3.21. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.18, the 2BSDEs (3.28) and (3.29) have unique solutions with
V 0 = inf
P∈P0
E
P
[
Y 0
]
, and V 0 = inf
P∈P0
E
P
[
Y 0
]
.
If moreover the Isaac’s–like condition G = G holds, then the game has a value.
Remark 3.22. The conditions G = G and H = H are equivalent in the uncontrolled volatility setting of Section
2.5. However they are not comparable in general. It can be readily checked that when a saddle–point exists, the
condition G = G actually implies that H = H when evaluated at this saddle–point, which is exactly what is needed
to conclude to the existence of a game value. Unlike the general case of Theorem 3.20 (ii), we can conclude here
the existence of a game value, without having to assume existence of a saddle–point.
4 Dynamic programming principle and viscosity property
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6 under the additional Assumption 3.5. As usual, the main tool is the dynamic
programming principle. We shall focus on the upper value, and the lower value can be analysed similarly. For
any t ∈ [0, T ], denote
bt(s, a) := b((t+ s) ∧ T, a), σt(s, a) := σ((t + s) ∧ T, a), (s, a) ∈ [0, T ]×A. (4.1)
We define P(t, α), At,..., in an obvious way, by replacing (b, σ) with (bt, σt). For each P ∈ P(t, α), define
Jt(ω, α,P) := E
P
[
ξt,ω +
∫ T−t
0
f t,ωs (αs)ds
]
, J t := sup
P∈P(t,α)
Jt(.,P), and V t(ω) := inf
α0∈A0t
sup
α1∈A1t
J t(ω, α
0, α1). (4.2)
As we will explain in Remark 4.4 below, we are not able to establish the DPP for V directly. To get around of
this difficulty, as an intermediate step we shall modify the upper value slightly. Following the idea of Pham and
Zhang [53], we restrict α0 to a class of appropriately defined simple processes. We note that in [53] both players
are restricted to such simple controls, while here we only need this restriction for the one playing first.
Let A0,pct denote the subset of A0t whose elements take the following form
α0s(ω) :=
n−1∑
i=0
mi∑
j=1
a0ij1Eij (ω)1[ti,ti+1)(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T − t, ω ∈ Ω, (4.3)
5See Mastrolia and Possamaï [48], Hernández Santibáñez and Mastrolia [41], and Sung [64] for a similar setting in the context of
moral hazard problems under uncertainty.
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where 0 = t0 < · · · < tn = T − t, {Eij}1≤j≤mi ⊂ Fti is a partition of Ω, and a0ij ∈ A0 are constants. Define
V
pc
t (ω) := inf
α0∈A0,pct
sup
α1∈A1t
J t(ω, α
0, α1). (4.4)
It is clear that
V t ≤ V pct . (4.5)
Moreover, the uniform continuity and the boundedness in Assumption 3.1, induce the following regularity imme-
diately.
Lemma 4.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5, J is uniformly continuous in ω, uniformly in (t, α,P). Conse-
quently, V and V
pc
are uniformly continuous in ω, uniformly in t.
We emphasise that the maps b and σ, and hence the probability measure P, do not depend on ω. When b or σ
depends on ω, the class P(t, α) will depend on ω, and thus one cannot fix an arbitrary P to discuss the regularly
of J in terms of ω. Indeed, in this general case, the regularity of V
pc
is the major difficulty in our approach, and
we shall investigate it further in Section 5 below.
The following result is crucial for the dynamic programming principle which will be established next, and is an
immediate consequence of [23, Remark 3.8 and Theorem 3.4].
Lemma 4.2. (i) Let α = (α0, α1) ∈ A0,pc0 × A10, t ∈ [0, T ], and P ∈ P(α). Then αt,ω ∈ A0,pct × A1t and the
regular conditional probability distribution Pt,ω ∈ P(t, αt,ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) Let t ∈ [0, T ], n ∈ N, α0 ∈ A0,pc0 , α0i ∈ A0,pct , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, {Ei}1≤i≤n ⊂ Ft a finite partition of Ω, and define
the control α˜0(ω ⊗t ω′) := 1[0,t)α0(ω) + 1[t,T ]
∑n
i=1 α
0
i (ω
′)1Ei(ω). Then α˜
0 ∈ A0,pc0 .
We now prove the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for V
pc
.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5, V
pc ∈ UCb(Θ), and
V
pc
t (ω) = inf
α0∈A0,pct
sup
α1∈A1t
sup
P∈P(t,α)
E
P
[(
V
pc)θ
τ
+
∫ τ
0
fθs (αs)ds
]
, for any θ ∈ Θ, and F−stopping time τ ≤ T − t.
Proof. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. We first establish the DPP for deterministic τ . Without loss of generality we will just prove the following
V
pc
0 = inf
α0∈A0,pc0
sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α)
J˜0(α,P), where J˜0(α,P) := E
P
[
V
pc
t +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
for 0 < t ≤ T. (4.6)
Step 1.1. We first prove ≤. By Lemma 4.1, J is uniformly continuous in ω. Since Ω is separable, for any
ǫ > 0, there exist a partition {Ei}i≥1 ⊂ Ft and ωi ∈ Ei such that |Jt(ω, α,P) − Jt(ωi, α,P)| ≤ ǫ for all ω ∈ Ei,
i ≥ 1, and all α ∈ A and P ∈ P(t, α). For each i, let α0i ∈ A0,pct be an ǫ−optimiser for V
pc
t (ω
i), namely
St(ω
i, α0i ) ≤ V
pc
t (ω
i) + ǫ, where St(ω, α
0
i ) := sup
α1∈A1t
sup
P∈P(t,α0
i
,α1)
Jt(ω, α
0
i , α
1,P). (4.7)
Notice that α0i does not depend on ω. Then it is clear that
|St(ω, α0i )− St(ωi, α0i )| ≤ ǫ, and |V
pc
t (ω)− V
pc
t (ω
i)| ≤ ǫ, for all ω ∈ Ei, i ≥ 1. (4.8)
Now for any α = (α0, α1) ∈ A0,pc0 ×A10 and P ∈ P(α), define α˜0 ∈ A0 as in Lemma 4.2 (ii). Note that (α˜0)t,ω = α0i
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for ω ∈ Ei. By Lemma 4.2 (i), we obtain
J0(α˜
0, α1,P) = EP
[
E
P
t,ω
[
ξt,ω +
∫ T−t
0
f t,ωs
((
α˜0
)t,ω
s
,
(
α1
)t,ω
s
)
ds
]
+
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
≤ EP
[∑
i≥1
St(ω, α
0
i )1Ei(ω) +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
≤ EP
[∑
i≥1
St(ω
i, α0i )1Ei(ω) +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
+ ǫ
≤ EP
[∑
i≥1
V
pc
t (ω
i)1Ei(ω) +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ EP
[∑
i≥1
V
pc
t (ω)1Ei(ω) +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
+ 3ǫ = EP
[
V
pc
t (ω) +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
+ 3ǫ = J˜0(α,P) + 3ǫ.
By the arbitrariness of α0, α1,P and ǫ, we prove the "≤" part of (4.6).
Step 1.2. We next prove ≥. Fix α0 =∑n−1i=0 1[ti,ti+1)∑mij=1 a0ij1Eij ∈ A0,pc0 as in (4.3). By otherwise adding
the point t in (4.6) into the partition points in the definition of α0, we may assume without loss of generality
that t = ti for a certain i. We claim that
sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
V
pc
ti
] ≤ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
V
pc
ti+1
]
, for all i = 0, · · · , n− 1, (4.9)
so that, since V
pc
tn = ξ
sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P[V
pc
ti ] ≤ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P[ξ], for all i = 0, · · · , n− 1,
thus implying the "≥" part of (4.6) by the arbitrariness of α0.
To see that (4.9) holds, fix i, α1 ∈ A10, and P ∈ P(α0, α1). For any ǫ > 0, by Pham and Zhang [53, Lemma 4.3],
one may choose the partition {Ek}k≥1 ⊂ Fti such that
sup
α∈A
sup
P∈P(α)
P
[ ⋃
k>N
Ek
]
≤ ǫ, for some N large enough.
Denote E˜N := ∪k>NEk, Eijk := Eij∩Ek for j = 1, · · · ,mi, k = 1, · · · , N , and E˜ij := Eij∩E˜N , for j = 1, · · · ,mi.
Fix an ωijk ∈ Eijk for each j, k, whenever Eijk 6= ∅. Recalling that {Eij}1≤j≤mi is a partition of Ω, we have
E
P
[
V
pc
ti
]
= EP
[
mi∑
j=1
V
pc
ti (ω)1Eij (ω)
]
≤ EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
V
pc
ti (ω)1Eijk(ω)
]
+ Cǫ
≤ EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
V
pc
ti (ω
ijk)1Eijk (ω)
]
+ Cǫ
≤ EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
sup
α˜1∈A1ti
sup
P˜∈P(ti,a0ij ,α˜
1)
E
P˜
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
ijk]
1Eijk(ω)
]
+ Cǫ,
where the first inequality is due to the boundedness of V
pc
and the last inequality used Step 1.1. For each j, k,
there exist α˜1jk ∈ A1ti and P˜jk ∈ P(ti, a0ij , α˜1jk) such that
sup
α˜1∈A1ti
sup
P˜∈P(ti,a0ij ,α˜
1)
E
P˜
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
ijk
]
≤ EP˜j
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
ijk
]
+ ǫ.
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Fix an arbitrary a1 ∈ A1 and P˜a0ij ,a1 ∈ P(ti, a0ij , a1). Define
α˜1 := 1[0,ti)α
1 + 1[ti,T ]
(
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
α˜1jk1Eijk + a11E˜N
)
, P˜ := P⊗ti
mi∑
j=1
(
N∑
k=1
P˜jk1Eijk + P˜
a0ij ,a11E˜ij
)
∈ P(α0, αˆ1).
Then
E
P
[
V
pc
ti
]
≤ EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
E
P˜jk
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
ijk
]
1Eijk(ω)
]
+ Cǫ
≤ EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
E
P˜jk
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
]
1Eijk(ω)
]
+ Cǫ = EP
[
mi∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
E
P˜
ti,ω
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
]
1Eijk(ω)
]
+ Cǫ
= EP
[
E
P˜
ti,ω
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
]
1E˜c
N
]
+ Cǫ ≤ EP
[
E
P˜
ti,ω
[
(V
pc
ti+1)
ti,ω
]]
+ Cǫ = EP˜
[
V
pc
ti+1
]
+ Cǫ.
This leads to (4.9) immediately.
Step 2. We next show that V
pc
is uniformly continuous in (t, ω). Let ρ denote the modulus of continuity
function of V
pc
with respect to ω. For t < t′ and ω ∈ Ω, denote δ := d∞((t, ω), (t′, ω)). By Step 1, we have
∣∣V pct − V pct′ ∣∣(ω) ≤ sup
α0∈A0,pct
sup
α1∈A1t
sup
P∈P(t,α0,α1)
∣∣∣∣EP[V pct′ (ω ⊗t X) + ∫ t′−t
0
f t,ωs (α
0
s, α
1
s)ds
]
− V pct′ (ω)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
α0∈A0,pct
sup
α1∈A1t
sup
P∈P(t,α0,α1)
E
P
[
ρ
(‖(ω ⊗t X)·∧t′ − ω·∧t′‖∞)+ ∫ δ
0
|f t,ωs (α0s, α1s)|ds
]
≤ sup
α0∈A0,pct
sup
α1∈A1t
sup
P∈P(t,α0,α1)
E
P
[
ρ
(
δ + ‖X·∧δ‖∞
)
+
∫ δ
0
|f t,ωs (α0s, α1s)|ds
]
≤ sup
P∈PL
E
P
[
ρ
(
δ + ‖X·∧δ‖∞
)]
+ Cδ,
for some L large enough. Under our conditions, this clearly implies the uniform continuity of V
pc
in (t, ω).
Step 3. Following standard approximation arguments, we may extend Theorem 4.3 to stopping times.
Remark 4.4. (i) Following similar arguments as in Step 1.1 above, one may prove the partial DPP for V :
V 0 ≤ inf
α0∈A00
sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
V t +
∫ t
0
fs(αs)ds
]
.
However, to prove the opposite inequality, we encountered some serious difficulties that we would like to highlight.
Let f = 0 for simplicity of presentation. Then we want to prove, for fixed α0 ∈ A00, that
sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P[ξ] ≥ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
sup
α˜1∈A1t
sup
P˜∈P(t,(α0)t,ω,α˜1)
E
P˜[ξt,ω ]
]
, (4.10)
which is the partial DPP for a control problem (instead of a game problem). However, we insist on the fact
that we are using weak formulation, which implies in particular that the control α1 depends on X, and the fixed
control α0 has typically absolutely no regularity with respect to X. The DPP for this problem is not available in
the literature, and there are indeed serious obstacles to overcome in order to establish it. Several authors managed
to obtain such DPP but either in strong formulation (see Nisio [49], Fleming and Souganidis [34], Święch [65],
Buckdahn and Li [9], Bouchard, Moreau and Nutz [6], Bouchard and Nutz [7], Krylov [46, 47]), or with the use
of simple strategies for both players (see Pham and Zhang [53] or Sîrbu [58, 59])6.
6A slight exception would be Kovats [44], which considers games written somehow in a weak formulation, but with strategies
against control, and relies on approximation techniques similar to [34].
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(ii) As we saw in Example 2.1, in the strong formulation setting of Subsection 2.1, the game value typically does
not exist. The main reason is that in this setting the DPP fails for the dynamic upper (and lower) value of the
game. In fact, in this case the dynamic version of V
S
0 in (2.2) is the following deterministic function (assuming
b = f = 0 for simplicity),
u(t, x) := inf
α0∈A0
S
sup
α1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g(Xt,x,αT−t )
]
, where Xt,x,αs = x+
∫ s
0
σt(r,Xt,x,αr , αr)dWr , 0 ≤ s ≤ T − t, P0 − a.s.
Under mild conditions, one can easily show that u(t, ·) is uniformly continuous in x. Following similar arguments
as in Step 1.2 (actually much easier because we have the desired regularity under the strong formulation), one
can prove the following partial DPP (stated for t1 = 0, t2 = t and x = 0 for simplicity),
u(0, 0) ≥ inf
α0∈A0
S
sup
α1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
u(t,Xαt )
]
.
However, the opposite direction of the DPP will not hold, since the game value does not exist. Let us explain why
the arguments in Step 1.1 fail in this setting.
By the uniform regularity of u in x, there exists a partition {Oi}i≥1 of Rd such that |u(t, x)− u(t, xi)| ≤ ǫ for all
x ∈ Oi, where xi ∈ Oi is fixed. Now for each i, let α0i ∈ A0S be an ǫ−optimiser of u(t, xi). Then we will have,
for any α ∈ AS
E
P0
[
u(t,Xαt )
] ≥ EP0[∑
i≥1
sup
α˜1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g(X
t,x,(α0i ,α˜
1)
T−t
]∣∣∣
x=Xαt
1Oi(X
α
t )
]
− ǫ ≥ sup
α˜1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g
(
X˜T
)]− ǫ,
where, denoting W ts := Wt+s −Wt,
X˜s = X
α
t +
∫ s
t
σ
(
r, X˜r,
∑
i≥1
α0i (r − t,W t· )1Oi(Xαt ), α˜1(r − t,W t)
)
dr, P0 − a.s. (4.11)
In other words, to prove the opposite direction of the DPP, essentially we want to prove
inf
α0∈A0
S
sup
α1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g(XαT )
] ≤ inf
α0∈A0
S
sup
α1∈A1
S
sup
α˜1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g
(
X˜T
)]
. (4.12)
Fix an α0 ∈ A0S . Note that the right side above involves only α0
∣∣
[0,t]
. The idea is to construct α˜0 ∈ A0S such that
sup
α1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g(X α˜
0,α1
T )
] ≤ sup
α1∈A1
S
sup
α˜1∈A1
S
E
P0
[
g(X˜T )
]
.
By (4.11), the most natural construction of α˜0 is to set α˜0(s,W·) := 1[0,t)(s)α0(s,W·) + 1[t,T ]
∑
i≥1 α
0
i (s −
t,W t· )1Oi(X
α
t ). This construction does work well in weak formulation, as we saw in Lemma 4.2 (ii). However,
in the strong formulation considered here, the above construction relies on Xαt , thus in turn on α
1
∣∣
[0,t]
. In other
words, the α0 in the left side of (4.12) will depend on α1. This is exactly the idea of the notion of strategy against
control introduced in Subsection 2.2, which is however not allowed in the current setting of strong formulation
with control against control.
We now derive the viscosity property of V
pc
. Once the DPP and the regularity of V
pc
have been established, it
is a rather straightforward verification.
Proposition 4.5. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5, V
pc
is a viscosity solution of the PPDE
−∂tV pc −Ht
(
∂ωV
pc
, ∂2ωωV
pc)
= 0. (4.13)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we shall only verify the L−viscosity property at (0, 0) for some L large enough.
Step 1. We first verify the viscosity sub–solution property. Assume by contradiction that there exists (κ, z, γ) ∈
J LV pc(0, 0) with corresponding hitting time hǫ such that −c := κ+H0(z, γ) < 0. By the definition of H , there
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exists a∗0 ∈ A0 such that κ+ supa1∈A1 h0(z, γ, a∗0, a1) ≤ − c2 < 0. By choosing ǫ > 0 small enough, it follows from
the uniform regularity of b, σ and f that
κ+ sup
a1∈A1
ht(ω, z, γ, a
∗
0, a1) ≤ −
c
3
< 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ hǫ(ω). (4.14)
Now fix the above ǫ > 0. For an arbitrary δ > 0, denote τ := hǫ ∧ δ ≤ hǫ. By (3.11) we have
−V pc0 ≤ inf
P∈PL
E
P
[
κτ + z ·Xτ + 1
2
Tr
[
γXτX
⊤
τ
]− V pcτ ]. (4.15)
On the other hand, by setting α0 as the constant process a∗0 in the right side of DPP (4.6), we have
V
pc
0 ≤ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(a∗0,α
1)
E
P
[
V
pc
τ +
∫ τ
0
fs(a
∗
0, α
1
s)ds
]
.
Choose α1 ∈ A10 and P ∈ P(a∗0, α1) such that
V
pc
0 ≤ EP
[
V
pc
τ +
∫ τ
0
fs(a
∗
0, α
1
s)ds
]
+ δ2. (4.16)
Note that ∪α∈AP(α) ⊂ PL for L large enough, and in particular the above P is also in PL. Then, we derive from
(4.15) and (4.16) that
−δ2 ≤ EP
[
κτ + z ·Xτ + 1
2
Tr
[
γXτX
⊤
τ
]
+
∫ τ
0
fs(a
∗
0, α
1
s)ds
]
= EP
[ ∫ τ
0
(
κ+ hs(z, γ, a
∗
0, α
1
s) + Tr
[
γb(s, a∗0, α
1
s)X
⊤
s
])
ds
]
.
Now by (4.14) we have
−δ2 ≤ EP
[
− c
3
τ +
∫ τ
0
Tr
[
γb(s, a∗0, α
1
s)X
⊤
s
]
ds
]
≤ − c
3
δ + CP
[
hǫ ≤ δ
]
+ CEP
[‖X·∧δ‖∞]δ.
Clearly EP
[‖X∧δ‖∞] ≤ CL√δ. Moroever, for δ ≤ ǫ2 ,
P
[
hǫ ≤ δ
] ≤ P[δ + ‖X·∧δ‖∞ ≥ ǫ] ≤ P[‖X∧δ‖∞ ≥ ǫ
2
] ≤ C
ǫ4
E
P
[‖X∧δ‖4∞] ≤ Cǫ,Lδ2.
Then 0 ≤ − c3δ + CCǫ,Lδ2 + CCLδ3/2 + δ2, which leads to the desired contradiction for small δ > 0.
Step 2. We next verify the viscosity super–solution property. Assume by contradiction that there exists (κ, z, γ) ∈
J Lu(0, 0) with corresponding hitting time hǫ such that c := κ+H0(z, γ) > 0. Then
κ+ sup
a1∈A1
h0(z, γ, a0, a1) ≥ c > 0, for all a0 ∈ A0,
and there exists a mapping ψ : A0 −→ A1 such that κ+ h0(z, γ, a0, ψ(a0)) ≥ c2 > 0, for all a0 ∈ A0. By choosing
ǫ > 0 small enough, it follows from the uniform regularity of b, σ and f that
κ+ ht(ω, z, γ, a0, ψ(a0)) ≥ c
3
> 0, for all a0 ∈ A0, 0 ≤ t ≤ hǫ(ω). (4.17)
Now fix the above ǫ > 0. For an arbitrary δ > 0, denote τ := hǫ ∧ δ ≤ hǫ. By (3.11) we have
−V pc0 ≥ sup
P∈PL
E
P
[
κτ + z ·Xτ + 1
2
Tr
[
γXτX
⊤
τ
]− V pcτ ]. (4.18)
On the other hand, by the DPP (4.6), there exists α0 ∈ A0 such that
V
pc
0 ≥ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
V
pc
τ +
∫ τ
0
fs(α
0
s, α
1
s)ds
]
− δ2.
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Since ∪α1∈A10P(α0, α1) ⊂ PL, the above estimate together with (4.18) implies
δ2 ≥ sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[
κτ + z ·Xτ + 1
2
Tr
[
γXτX
⊤
τ
]
+
∫ τ
0
fs(α
0
s, α
1
s)ds
]
= sup
α1∈A10
sup
P∈P(α0,α1)
E
P
[∫ τ
0
(
κ+ hs(z, γ, α
0
s, α
1
s) + Tr
[
γb(s, α0s, α
1
s)X
⊤
s
])
ds
]
.
Choose α1 := ψ(α0). By the structure of α0, we see α1 is also piecewise constant and thus P(α0, α1) 6= ∅. Set
P ∈ P(α0, α1) ⊂ PL. Then
δ2 ≥ EP
[ ∫ τ
0
(
κ+ hs(z, γ, α
0
s, ψ(α
0
s)) + Tr
[
γb(s, α0s, ψ(α
0
s))X
⊤
s
])
ds
]
≥ EP
[ ∫ τ
0
( c
3
+ Tr
[
γb(s, α0s, ψ(α
0
s))X
⊤
s
])
ds
]
,
thanks to (4.17). Now following the same arguments as in Step 1, we obtain 0 ≥ c3δ − Cǫ,Lδ2 − Cδ3/2, which
leads to the desired contradiction by choosing δ > 0 small enough.
Finally, we can prove our main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Following similar arguments, one may define V pct by restricting α
1 to piecewise constant
processes in the problem V t, and show that V
pc ∈ UCb(Θ,R) is a viscosity solution of the PPDE
−∂tV pc −Ht(∂ωV pc, ∂2ωωV pc) = 0. (4.19)
Clearly V
pc
T = ξ = V
pc
T . Then it follows from Isaacs’s condition (3.10) and the uniqueness assumption for
viscosity solutions of the PPDEs, that V
pc
= V pc. Moreover, recalling (4.5), we deduce V pc ≤ V ≤ V ≤ V pc,
and therefore V = V .
5 An extension
In this section we shall relax Assumption 3.5, and replace the expectation J0(α,P) in (3.4) with the solution to
a nonlinear BSDE, as in the seminal paper of Buckdahn and Li [9].
For α ∈ A and P ∈ P(α), consider the solution (Y α,P, Zα,P, Nα,P) of the BSDE
Y α,Pt = ξ(X) +
∫ T
t
fs
(
X·, Y
α,P
s , σs(X·, αs)Z
α,P
s , αs
)
ds− Zα,Ps · dMαs + dNα,Ps , P− a.s. (5.1)
where Mα is defined in (3.2), and Nα,P is an P−martingale orthogonal to X (or equivalently to Mα) under P,
namely 〈Nα,P, X〉 = 0, P− a.s. Recall (3.2), so that BSDE (5.1) can be rewritten, P−a.s.
Y α,Pt = ξ(X) +
∫ T
t
[
fs
(
X·, Y
α,P
s , σs(X·, αs)Z
α,P
s , αs
)
+ Zα,Ps bs(X·, αs)
]
ds− Zα,Ps dXs + dNα,Ps . (5.2)
In this section we shall assume
Assumption 5.1. (i) b, σ and ξ satisfy the conditions in Assumption 3.1.
(ii) f is F−progressively measurable in all variables, and the function ft(ω, 0, 0, a) is bounded.
(iii) f is locally uniformly continuous in (t, ω, a), locally uniformly in (y, z). That is, for any R > 0, there exists
a modulus of continuity function ρR such that
|ft(ω, y, z, a)− ft′(ω′, y, z, a)| ≤ ρR
(
d∞(θ, θ
′)
)
for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, |y|, |z| ≤ R, a ∈ A.
(iv) f is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (y, z).
Under Assumption 5.1, the BSDE (5.1) is well–posed with F−progressively measurable solutions. By abusing
the notations, we redefine (3.4) as
J0(α,P) := Y
α,P
0 , (5.3)
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and still define J0(α), J0(α) by (3.4), the upper and lower values (V 0, V 0) by (3.5), and a saddle–point αˆ of the
game by (3.6), but using the newly defined J0(α,P).
It is quite straightforward to extend the results in Subsection 3.3 to this setting. In this section, we shall focus
on extending Theorem 3.6 to this general case. We remark that the nonlinear extension to BSDE does not
cause significant difficulty, and as we explained, the main difficulty is the regularity of the value functions due
to the dependence of b and σ on ω. As mentioned in Subsection 2.4, in the Markovian case this difficulty can
be circumvented by using the idea of Sîrbu [58, 59]. In this section we shall provide a sufficient condition, in
addition to Assumption 5.1, under which we are able to extend Theorem 3.6 for path–dependent games.
We first notice that in this case the Hamiltonians become (again abusing notations)
ht(ω, y, z, γ, a) :=
1
2
Tr
[
σσ⊤t (ω, a)γ
]
+ bt(ω, a) · z + ft(ω, y, zσt(ω, a), a),
Ht(ω, y, z, γ) := inf
a0∈A0
sup
a1∈A1
ht(ω, y, z, γ, a), Ht(ω, y, z, γ) := sup
a1∈A1
inf
a0∈A0
ht(ω, y, z, γ, a).
(5.4)
5.1 Drift reduction by Girsanov transformation
In this subsection we illustrate that there is flexibility on the drift b, through the Girsanov transformation. For
any λ : Θ×A −→ Rd, denote
σ′ := σ, b′ := b− σλ, f ′ := f + z · λ, ξ′ := ξ,
h′t(ω, y, z, γ, a) :=
1
2
Tr
[
(σ′)2t (ω, a)γ
]
+ b′t(ω, a) · z + f ′t(ω, y, zσt(ω, a), a),
(5.5)
and define P ′(α), Y ′α,P, J ′0(α),..., in an obvious manner. It is clear that h′ = h, and thus the corresponding
Isaacs equation will remain the same. We show that the game values are invariant under this transformation.
Proposition 5.2. Let b, σ, f, ξ satisfy Assumption 5.1. Assume λ is bounded, F−progressively measurable in
all variables, uniformly continuous in (t, ω) under d∞, uniformly in a ∈ A, and is locally uniformly continuous
in a, in the sense of Assumption 5.1(iii). Then J
′
0(α) = J0(α) and J
′
0(α) = J0(α) for any α ∈ A.
Proof. First, it is clear that b′, σ′, f ′, ξ′ also satisfy Assumption 5.1. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Let Ω := Ω × Ω with canonical process (X,W ). For any α ∈ A, denote by P(α) the set of probability
measures P on Ω such that W is a P−Brownian motion and (3.1) holds P−a.s. Then clearly P(α) = {P :=
P ◦X−1 : P ∈ P(α)}. Now for each P ∈ P(α), define
dWαt = dWt + λt(X·, αt(X·))dt,
dP
′
dP
:= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
λt(X·, αt(X·)) · dWt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt(X·, αt(X·))|2dt
)
.
Then Wα is an P
′−Brownian motion and
dXt = b
′
t(X·, αt(X·))dt+ σ
′
t(X·, αt(X·))dW
α
t , P
′ − a.s.,
that is to say P
′ ∈ P ′(α). Similarly one may construct P ∈ P(α) from P′ ∈ P ′(α), which implies that there is a
one–to–one correspondence between P(α) and P ′(α) through Girsanov transformations.
Step 2. We now turn to the backward problem. Since the solution of (5.1) is FX−measurable, then, by embedding
them into the enlarged canonical space Ω, we have
Y α,Pt = ξ(X) +
∫ T
t
fs(X·, Y
α,P
s , Z
α,P
s , αs(X·))ds−
∫ T
t
Z
α,P
s · dWs +Nα,PT −Nα,Pt , P− a.s.
where Z
α,P
t = σt(X·, αt(X·))Z
α,P
t . This implies
Y α,Pt = ξ
′(X) +
∫ T
t
f ′s(X·, Y
α,P
s , Z
α,P
s , αs(X·))ds−
∫ T
t
Z
α,P
s · dWαs +Nα,PT −Nα,Pt , P− a.s.
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Notice that P
′
is equivalent to P, so that the last decomposition also holds P
′
-a.s. Denote P′ := P
′ ◦X−1. By the
uniqueness of the solution to the BSDE, we see that Y α,P = Y α,P
′
. Since P ′(α) = {P′ := P′ ◦X−1 : P′ ∈ P ′(α)}
and recalling from Step 1 that P(α) and P ′(α) are in a one–to–one correspondence, we see that J ′0(α) = J0(α)
and J ′0(α) = J0(α).
Remark 5.3. (i) While very natural, the above result relies heavily on our formulation that α (and λ) depends on
X only. When α (or λ) depends on W , the one to one correspondence in Step 1 above fails, and α(W ) 6= α(Wα),
thus the game values may not be equal under the Girsanov transformation, even though the Hamiltonians remain
the same. See Subsection 2.1 where the upper and lower values of the corresponding game are not related to the
solutions to the corresponding Isaacs equations.
(ii) Notice that the transformation in (5.5) changes the map f as well. Given Assumption 3.18 (i), if we apply
the above transformation, then the convex sets in Assumption 3.18 (ii) reduces to{(
σt(x, a0, a), ft(x, a0, a) + z · λt(x, a0, a)
)
: a ∈ A1
}
,
{(
σt(x, a, a1), ft(x, a, a1) + z · λt(x, a, a1)
)
: a ∈ A0
}
.
Hence, Proposition 5.2 does not help simplifying Assumption 3.18 (ii).
5.2 State independent range of controls
In this subsection, we relax Assumption 3.5, and assume the following.
Assumption 5.4. (i) b = b0(t, ω, a) + σ(t, ω, a)λ(t, ω, a), where λ is bounded, F−progressively measurable, uni-
formly continuous in (t, ω) under d∞, uniformly in a ∈ A, in the sense of Assumption 5.1 (iii).
(ii) Player 1 has state independent range of controls with respect to (b0, σ) in the sense that for any t ∈ [0, T ], a0 ∈
A0, the range Rt(a0) := {(b0, σ)(t, ω, a0, a1) : a1 ∈ A1} is independent of ω.
(iii) Player 0 has state independent range of controls with respect to (b0, σ) in a similar sense.
Notice that Assumption 3.5 obviously implies Assumption 5.4. We next provide a non–trivial example satisfying
Assumption 5.4. For simplicity, we shall only focus on σ and verify (ii).
Example 5.5. Let d = 1, A0 = A1 = R, η ∈ UC(Θ), and σ, σ : R → (0, 1) satisfy σ < σ, limx→−∞ σ(x) =
limx→−∞ σ(x) = 0, limx→∞ σ(x) = limx→∞ σ(x) = 1 (for instance, we could take σ to be the cdf of the standard
normal distribution, and σ(x) := σ(x+ 1)). Define
σt(ω, a) :=
(
σ(a0) + σ(a1)
) ∨ (ηt(ω) + a0 + a1) ∧ (σ(a0) + σ(a1)). (5.6)
For any t, ω, a0, one may check straightforwardly that
inf
a1∈A1
σt(ω, a0, a1) = σ(a0), sup
a1∈A1
σt(ω, a0, a1) = σ(a0) + 1.
That is, Rt(a0) = (σ(a0), σ(a0) + 1) (the σ part only) is independent of ω.
Moreover, we verify that
inf
a0∈A0
sup
a1∈A1
σt(ω, a) = inf
a0∈A0
[σ(a0) + 1] = 1, sup
a1∈A1
inf
a0∈A0
σt(ω, a) = sup
a1∈A1
σ(a1) = 1.
Then the Isaacs’s condition infa0∈A0 supa1∈A1 σ
2
t (ω, a)γ = supa1∈A1 infa0∈A0 σ
2
t (ω, a)γ is immediately checked for
γ ≥ 0. One can similarly verify the Isaacs’s condition for γ < 0.
Our main result which generalises Theorem 3.6 is given below.
Theorem 5.6. Let Assumptions 3.1, 5.4, and Isaacs condition (3.10) hold. Then
(i) The following path–dependent Isaacs equation has a viscosity solution u ∈ UCb(Θ,R)
−∂tu−Ht(ω, u, ∂ωu, ∂2ωωu) = 0, t < T, uT = ξ. (5.7)
(ii) Assume further that uniqueness of viscosity solution for the above PPDE holds in the class UCb(Θ,R). Then
V 0 = V 0 = u0(0).
26
Proof. First, by Proposition 5.2, it suffices to prove the theorem in the case λ = 0. Thus in this proof we assume
the two players have state independent range of controls with respect to (b, σ). We shall focus on the upper value
process V t(ω) and follow the arguments in Section 4.
Fix (t, ω) ∈ Θ. In this case (4.1) becomes:
bt,ω(s, ω˜, a) := b((t+ s) ∧ T, ω ⊗t ω˜, a), σt,ω(s, a) := σ((t+ s) ∧ T, ω ⊗t ω˜, a), (s, ω˜, a) ∈ Θ×A. (5.8)
For α ∈ A, let P(t, ω, α) denote the set of weak solutions to the SDE
Xs =
∫ s
0
bt,ω(r,X·, αr(X·))dr +
∫ s
0
σt,ω(r,X·, αr(X·))dWr .
We emphasise that in this case P depends on ω. Define At(ω) in an obvious way. Then (4.2) becomes
V t(ω) := inf
α0∈A0t (ω)
St(ω, α
0), St(ω, α
0) := sup
α1∈A1t (ω)
sup
P∈P(t,ω,α0,α1)
Y t,ω,α
0,α1,P
0 , (5.9)
where
Y t,ω,α,Ps = ξ
t,ω +
∫ T−t
s
(
f t,ωr
(
X·, Y
t,ω,α,P
r , σ
t,ω
r (X·, αr)Z
t,ω,α,P
r , αr
)
+ Zt,ω,α,Pr b
t,ω
r (X·, αr)
)
dr
−
∫ T−t
s
Zt,ω,α,Ps dXr −
∫ T−t
s
dN t,ω,α,Ps , P− a.s.
Notice that, for fixed (α,P), by BSDE arguments one can easily show that ω 7−→ Y t,ω,α,P0 is uniformly continuous.
However, the sets P(t, ω, α) and At(ω) may depend on ω, and thus in general we cannot fix (α,P) for different
ω. This causes the main difficulty for obtaining the desired regularity of V and S.
We shall use Assumption 5.4 (ii) to get around this difficulty. As in Section 4, we restrict α0 to A0,pct . We
emphasise that A0,pct does not depend on ω and A0,pct ⊂ A0t (ω) for all ω. We then modify (4.4) as
V
pc
t (ω) := inf
α0∈A0,pct
St(ω, α
0). (5.10)
Fix α0 ∈ A0,pct , define
A1t
(
α0
)
:=
{(
b˜, σ˜
) ∈ L0(Θ)× L0(Θ) : (b˜s(ω˜), σ˜s(ω˜)) ∈ Rt+s(α0s(ω˜)), (s, ω˜) ∈ Θ}.
We emphasise that, by Assumption 5.4 (ii), A1t
(
α0
)
does not depend on ω. For each (b˜, σ˜) ∈ A1t (α0), let P(b˜, σ˜)
denote the set of weak solutions of the SDE
X˜s =
∫ s
0
b˜r
(
X˜·
)
dr +
∫ s
0
σ˜r
(
X˜·
)
dWr .
One can check straightforwardly that ∪(b˜,σ˜)∈A1t (α0)P˜(b˜, σ˜) = ∪α1∈A1t (ω)P(t, ω, α
0, α1) for all ω ∈ Ω. Moreover,
denote A1(s, b˜, σ˜, a0) := {a1 ∈ A1 : (b˜, σ˜) ∈ Rs(a0, a1)}, and
f˜ t,ω,b˜,σ˜s (ω˜, y, z, a0) := sup
a1∈A1(t+s,b˜s(ω˜),σ˜s(ω˜),a0)
f t,ωs (ω˜, y, z, a0, a1).
Then, by the comparison principle for BSDEs, it is immediate to verify that
St(ω, α
0) := sup
(b˜,σ˜)∈A1t (α
0)
sup
P∈P˜(b˜,σ˜)
Y˜ t,ω,b˜,σ˜,P0 , (5.11)
where
Y˜ t,ω,b˜,σ˜,Ps = ξ
t,ω +
∫ T−t
s
(
f˜ t,ωr
(
X·, Y
t,ω,b˜,σ˜,P
r , σ˜r(X·)Z
t,ω,b˜,σ˜,P
r , α
0
r(X·)
)
+ Zt,ω,b˜,σ˜,Pr b˜r(X·)
)
dr
−
∫ T−t
s
Zt,ω,b˜,σ˜,Ps dXr −
∫ T−t
s
dN t,ω,b˜,σ˜,Ps , P− a.s.
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Now for each (b˜, σ˜) ∈ A1t (α0) and P ∈ P˜(b˜, σ˜), which do not depend on ω, by standard BSDE arguments one can
show that ω 7−→ Y˜ t,ω,b˜,σ˜,P0 is uniformly continuous. Then as in Lemma 4.1 we see that S and V
pc
are uniformly
continuous in ω. The rest of the proof follows then from the arguments in Section 4, combined with standard
BSDE arguments. We leave the details to interested readers.
As mentioned in Remark 3.7 (iii), the approach in Ekren and Zhang [20] can be used in this context to identify
sufficient conditions for (ii) to hold in Theorem 5.6. However, we note that the definition of viscosity solution is
slightly different in [20]. Rigorously speaking, if we want to apply the results of [20] to conclude the existence
of game value in Theorem 5.6, we need to verify that V pc and V
pc
are viscosity solutions in the sense of [20].
This is done in [20], but using the formulation of strategy against control as in Subsection 2.2, exactly due to
the regularity issue. As we saw, Assumption 5.4 enables us to overcome the regularity difficulty, and thus we can
apply the arguments in [20] to our context. We leave the details to interested readers.
6 Proof of Theorems 3.20 and 3.21
Throughout this section Assumptions 3.1 and 3.18 are in force.
6.1 A relaxed formulation
To establish the wellposedness of 2BSDEs, we shall apply the results of Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [54], which
relie on the dynamic programming principle in El Karoui and Tan [22, 23] (see also Nutz and van Handel [50]).
However, we shall note that the weak formulation considered in [22, 23] is different from the feedback controls in
this paper. So our first goal is to establish the equivalence between these two formulations.7
We now fix α0 ∈ A00, and denote ϕt(ω, a1) := ϕt(ω, α0t (ω), a1) for ϕ = b, σ, f . The weak formulation in [23,
Section 1.2, pages 7–9] consists in working on a fixed canonical space for both the controlled process and the
associated controls. Let C([0, T ],Rd) be the canonical space of continuous functions on [0, T ] with values in Rd,
and let A be the collection of all finite and positive Borel measures on [0, T ] × A1, whose projection on [0, T ]
is the Lebesgue measure. In other words, every q ∈ A can be disintegrated as q(ds, da) = qs(da)ds, for an
appropriate kernel qs. The weak formulation requires to consider a subset of A, namely the set A0 of all q ∈ A
such that the kernel qs is of the form δφs(da) for some Borel function φ. We then define the canonical space
Ω := C([0, T ],Rd)× A, with canonical process (X,Λ), where
Xt(ω, q) := ω(t), Λ(ω, q) := q, (t, ω, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
The associated canonical filtration is defined by F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] where
Ft := σ
(
(Xs,∆s(ϕ)), (s, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A1)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
whereCb([0, T ]×A1) is the set of bounded continuous functions on [0, T ]×A1, and∆s(ϕ) :=
∫ s
0
∫
A
ϕ(r, a)Λ(dr, da),
for all (s, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]× Cb([0, T ]×A1). We next define the following set of measures on (Ω,FT ):
P :=
{
P :M(ϕ) is an (P,F)−martingale for all ϕ ∈ C2b (Rd), and P[X0 = x0,Λ ∈ A0] = 1
}
,
where C2b (R
d) is the set of bounded twice continuously differentiable functions with bounded derivatives, and
Ms(ϕ) := ϕ(Xs)−
∫ s
0
∫
A1
(
br(X·, a) ·Dϕ(Xr) + 1
2
Tr
[
(σσ⊤)r(X·, a)D
2ϕ(Xr)
])
Λ(dr, da).
The associated weak formulation of the control problem is then defined by
Vw := sup
P∈P
Jw(P) where Jw(P) := E
P
[
g(X·) +
∫ T
0
∫
A1
f t(X·, a)Λ(dt, da)
]
.
Lemma 6.1. P = P00 (α0) and Vw = supP∈P10(α0) EP
α
[
Y
α0
0
]
.
7Most of the arguments here are from discussions with Xiaolu Tan, who we thank warmly.
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Proof. By the requirement Λ ∈ A0, P ∈ P amounts to say there exist a process φP, possibly in an enlarged space,
and a Brownian motion W P, such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
bs
(
X·, φ
P
s
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σs
(
X·, φ
P
s
)
dW Ps , P− a.s., and Jw(P) := EP
[
g(X·) +
∫ T
0
f t(X·, φ
P
t )dt
]
.
On the other hand, the set P00 (α0) corresponds to those P such that φP is FX−progressively measurable. Then
clearly P00 (α0) ⊂ P . Now fix P ∈ P . Apply the classical results of Wong [68, Theorem 4.2], we obtain the
existence of another P−Brownian motion W˜ P such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
b˜Psds+
∫ t
0
σ˜PsdW˜
P
s , P− a.s., and Jw(P) := EP
[
g(X·) +
∫ T
0
f˜Pt dt
]
where b˜Ps := E
P
[
bs
(
X·, φ
P
s
)∣∣FXs ], σ˜Ps := EP[σs(X·, φPs)∣∣FXs ], and f˜Ps := EP[f s(X·, φPs)∣∣FXs ]. Using the fact that
range of (b, σ, f) is assumed to be convex, there exists an FX−progressively measurable process α˜P such that
b˜Ps = bs
(
X·, α˜
P
s
)
, σ˜Ps = σs
(
X·, α˜
P
s
)
, and f˜Ps = fs
(
X·, α˜
P
s
)
. This implies that P ∈ P00 (α0) and Jw(P) = J(α0, α˜P),
thus inducing the required result.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3.20
We will only prove the result for the 2BSDE (3.22), the remaining proof is similar. We first address the well–
posedness by verifying the conditions of Possamaï, Tan and Zhou [54]. We introduce the dynamic version
P00 (α1)(t, ω) of the set P00 (α1), by considering the same SDE on [t, T ] starting at time t from the path ω ∈ Ω.
We first verify that the family {P00 (α1)(t, ω), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω} is saturated, in the terminology of [54, Definition
5.1], i.e. for all P1 ∈ P00 (α1)(t, ω), and P2 ∼ P1 under which X is an P2−martingale, we must have P2 ∈
P00 (α1)(t, ω). To see this, notice that the equivalence between P1 and P2 implies that the quadratic variation of
X is not changed by passing from P1 to P2. Hence the required result.
Since σ and b are bounded, it follows from the definition of admissible controls that F satisfies the integrability
and Lipschitz continuity assumptions required in [54]. We also directly check from the fact that f is bounded,
together with [60, Lemma 6.2] that sup
P∈P00 (α
1) E
P
[
essupP0≤t≤T
(
EP
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣F (0, σ̂2s)∣∣κds∣∣F+t ])p/κ] < ∞, for some
p > κ ≥ 1.
Then, the dynamic programming requirements of [54, Assumption 2.1] follow from the more general results
given in El Karoui and Tan [22, 23] (see also Nutz and van Handel [50]), thanks to Lemma 6.1. Finally, since
ξ is bounded, the required well–posedness result is a direct consequence of [60, Lemma 6.2] together with [54,
Theorems 4.1 and 5.1].
Now, the representation for V 0 is immediate, see for instance the similar proof in [15, Proposition 4.6].
Remark 6.2. Let us investigate the 2BSDEs further under additional regularity of the solution. In particular,
this will provide a formal justification of the fact that (3.26) implies (3.10). For this purpose, we extend and
abuse slightly our earlier notations. Omitting ω as usual, we define
Σt(a) :=
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(a), Σ1t (a0) :=
{
Σt(a0, a1), a1 ∈ A1
}
, Σ0t (a1) :=
{
Σt(a0, a1), a0 ∈ A0
}
,
A0(t,Σ, a1) :=
{
a0 ∈ A0 :
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(a0, a1) = Σ
}
, A1(t,Σ, a0) :=
{
a1 ∈ A1 :
(
σtσ
⊤
t
)
(a0, a1) = Σ
}
, (6.1)
F t(z,Σ, a0) := supa1∈A1(t,Σ,a0) Ft(z, a0, a1), F t(z,Σ, a1) := infa0∈A0(t,Σ,a1) Ft(z, a0, a1).
Then one can check straightforwardly that
Ht(z, γ) = inf
a0∈A0
sup
Σ∈Σ1t (a0)
{1
2
Tr
[
Σγ
]
+F t(z,Σ, a0)
}
, Ht(z, γ) = sup
a1∈A1
inf
Σ∈Σ0t (a1)
{1
2
Tr
[
Σγ
]
+F t(z,Σ, a1)
}
. (6.2)
Assume that the processes K in the definition of the 2BSDEs is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure (see the formal discussion in [54, pp. 21-22], as well as rigorous arguments in the simpler setting of
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G−expectations in [52]), and can be written as
dKα
1
t
dt
=
1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2tΓ
α1
t
]
+ F t
(
Zα
1
t , σ̂
2
t , α
1
t
)− inf
Σ∈Σ0t (α
1)
{
1
2
Tr
[
ΣΓα
1
t
]
+ F t
(
Zα
1
t ,Σ, α
1
t
)}
,
dK
α0
t
dt
= sup
Σ∈Σ1t (α
0)
{
1
2
Tr
[
ΣΓ
α0
t
]
+ F t
(
Z
α0
t ,Σ, α
0
t
)}− 1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2tΓ
α0
t
]− F t(Zα0t , σ̂2t , α0t ),
for some predictable processes Γα
1
and Γ
α0
. Now given (3.26), (3.22) and (3.23) reduce to the same BSDE under
P̂. Then Y α̂
1
= Y
α̂0
=: Ŷ , Zα̂
1
= Z
α̂0
=: Zˆ, P̂−a.s. This would imply further that Γα̂1 = Γα̂
0
=: Γ̂. Then by
(3.26) again we have
Ht(Ẑt, Γ̂t) ≥ inf
Σ∈Σ0t (α̂
1)
{
1
2
Tr
[
ΣΓ̂t
]
+ F t
(
Ẑt,Σ, α̂
1
t
)}
=
1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2t Γ̂t
]
+ F t
(
Ẑt, σ̂
2
t , α̂
1
t
)
=
1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2t Γ̂t
]
+ F t
(
Ẑt, σ̂
2
t , α̂
1
t
)
= sup
Σ∈Σ1t (α̂
0)
{
1
2
Tr
[
ΣΓ̂t
]
+ F t
(
Ẑt,Σ, α̂
0
t
)} ≥ Ht(Ẑt, Γ̂t).
This implies (3.10) at (Ẑt, Γ̂t), and we see that (α̂0, α̂1) is a saddle point of the Hamiltonian.
Remark 6.3. In the spirit of relaxed controls, we may reformulate our game problem by using the notion of
mixed strategies, exactly as in Sîrbu [57]. For i = 0, 1, let P(Ai) denote the set of probability measures on Ai,
and mi : Θ −→ P(Ai) be F−measurable, i = 0, 1. Let P be a weak solution of the SDE
Xt =
∫ t
0
[mb]s(X·)ds+
∫ t
0
[m(σσ⊤)]1/2s (X·)dWs. (6.3)
where [mϕ]t(ω, λ) :=
∫
A
ϕt(ω, λ, a)m0(t, ω, da0)m1(t, ω, da1), for any function ϕt(ω, λ, a) with λ ∈ Rd. Denote
J0(m,P) := E
P
[
ξ(X·) +
∫ T
0
[mf ]t(X·)dt
]
.
Then we can introduce the zero–sum game in the setting in an obvious manner. The advantage of this formulation
is that Isaacs’s condition always holds H
′
t(ω, z, γ) = H
′
t(ω, z, γ), where
H
′
t(ω, z, γ) := inf
m0∈P(A0)
sup
m1∈P(A1)
[mh]t(ω, z, γ), H
′
t(ω, z, γ) := sup
m1∈P(A1)
inf
m0∈P(A0)
[mh]t(ω, z, γ),
are the randomised versions of the upper and lower Hamiltonians. It would be interesting to extend our results
to this formulation which does not require Isaacs’s condition to hold. See also the contribution of Buckdahn, Li
and Quincampoix [10], who considered a setting similar to Buckdahn and Li [9], but where the players see each
other’s actions with a delay relative to a fixed time grid, and both play mixed delayed strategies. Notice that we
always have H ≤ H ′ = H ′ ≤ H, so that when the standard Isaacs’s condition (3.10) holds, they are all equal.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.21
The wellposedness and the representation for V 0 are proved as in the previous section. For α
1 ∈ A1, the 2BSDE
Y α
1
t = ξ +
∫ T
t
g
s
(
Zα
1
s , σ̂
2
s , α
1
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zα
1
s · dXs −
∫ T
t
dKα
1
s , P− a.s. for all P ∈ P .
induces the following representation
inf
P∈P
E
P
[
Y α
1
0
]
= inf
α0∈A00
J0(α).
Then, the comparison theorem for 2BSDEs, see [54, Theorem 4.3] implies that Y α1t ≤ Yt. By an obvious extension
of the argument of El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [21, Corollary 3.1] to 2BSDEs, we deduce the desired result.
Finally, the existence of a value is now immediate when G = G.
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7 Appendix: proof of Theorem 3.16
We start with the continuous coefficients setting, where the result looks standard. We nevertheless provide a
detailed proof for completeness.
Lemma 7.1. Assume b : Θ −→ Rd and σ : Θ −→ Sd are bounded, F−measurable, and for each t, b(t, ·) and
σ(t, ·) are continuous. Then the SDE of Theorem 3.16 has a weak solution
Proof. Assume W is an P0−Brownian motion. For n ≥ 1, denote ti := inT , i = 0, · · · , n, and define
Xnt0 := 0, X
n
t := X
n
ti +
∫ t
ti
b(s,Xn·∧ti)ds+
∫ t
ti
σ(s,Xn·∧ti)dWs, t ∈ [ti, ti+1], i = 0, · · · , n− 1.
Define Pn := P0 ◦ (Xn)−1. Then Pn ⊂ PL for L large enough, and Pn is a weak solution to the SDE of Theorem
3.16 with the coefficients bn(t, ω) := b(t, ωtn
i
∧·), and σn(t, ω) := σ(t, ωtn
i
∧·), t ∈ [ti, ti+1], i = 0, · · · , n − 1. Note
that bn, σn are uniformly bounded. By Zheng [72], {Pn}n≥1 has a weakly convergent subsequence, and for
notational simplicity we assume Pn −→ P weakly. Now it suffices to verify that P is a weak solution to the SDE
of Theorem 3.16. For this purpose, we first recall that by Zhang [71, Lemmata 9.2.4 (i) and (9.2.18)]
there exist {Em}m≥1 ⊂ FT such that each Em is compact and supP∈PL E[Ecm] ≤ 2−m,
and for each m and each ω ∈ Em, we have ωt∧· ∈ Em for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(7.1)
Denote
Mt := Xt −
∫ t
0
b(s,X·)ds, Nt :=MtM
⊤
t −
∫ t
0
σ2(s,X·)ds, (7.2)
and defineMn, Nn by replacing (b, σ) above with (bn, σn). Then it is equivalent to prove that P is a weak solution
to the SDE of Theorem 3.16, and that M and N are P−martingales. First, for any s < t and any η ∈ C0b (Fs),
by the definition of Pn, we have E
Pn [(Mnt −Mns )ηs] = 0. Note that Mt −Ms = Xt −Xs −
∫ t
s b(r,X·)dr. Since
b(r, ·) is continuous for each r, by the weak convergence of Pn, together with the bounded convergence theorem
(under the Lebesgue measure), we have
lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
ηs
∫ t
s
b(r,X·)dr
]
= EP
[
ηs
∫ t
s
b(r,X·)dr
]
.
Moreover, for any R > 0, denote by IR(x) the truncation of x by R and Xs,t := Xt −Xs, we have
lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
IR(Xs,t)ηs
]
= EP
[
IR(Xs,t)ηs
]
, sup
P′∈PL
E
P
′
[
|(Xs,t)− IR(Xs,t)|2
]
≤ 1
R
sup
P′∈PL
E
P
′
[
|Xs,t|3
]
≤ C
R
.
Denoting similarly Ms,t :=Mt −Ms and Mns,t :=Mnt −Mns , wee see that
E
P
[
Ms,tηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
Ms,tηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[(
Ms,t −Mns,t
)
ηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pn
[
ηs
∫ t
s
[b(r,X·)− bn(r,X·)]dr
]
= lim
n→∞
∫ t
s
E
Pn
[
ηs
(
b(r,X·)− bn(r,X·)
)]
dr. (7.3)
Now for each r ∈ [s, t] and m ≥ 1, since b(r, ·) is continuous and Em is compact, b(r, ·) is uniformly continuous
on Em with a certain modulus of continuity function ρr,m. Then, by the definition of bn and (7.1)∣∣∣EPn[ηs(b(r,X·)− bn(r,X·))]∣∣∣ ≤ CEPn[|b(r,X·)− bn(r,X·)|1Em]+ CPn[Ecm]
≤ CEPn
[
ρr,m
(
OSC2−n(X)
)]
+ C2−m ≤ CEPn
[
ρr,m
(
OSC2−k(X)
)]
+ C2−m,
for any k ≤ n, where OSCδ(X) := supt1,t2:|t1−t2|≤δ |Xt1 −Xt2 |. Fix m, k and send n −→∞, we deduce
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣EPn[ηs(b(r,X·)− bn(r,X·))]∣∣∣ ≤ CEP[ρr,m(OSC2−k(X))]+ C2−m.
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By first sending k −→ ∞ and then m −→ ∞, we have limn→∞ EPn
[
ηs
(
b(r,X·) − bn(r,X·)
)]
= 0, and by the
bounded convergence theorem, it follows from (7.3) that EP[Ms,tηs] = 0, i.e. M is an P−martingale. Similarly
one can show that N is an P−martingale. Therefore, P is a weak solution to the SDE of Theorem 3.16.
Proof of Theorem 3.16 For ǫ > 0, let Ωǫt be a common set for (b, σ) as in Definition 3.15. By Zhang [71,
Problem 10.5.3], there exists (bǫ, σǫ) such that (bǫ, σǫ)(t, ·) agree with (b, σ)(t, ·) on Ωǫt and are continuous for
each t. Moreover, by the construction in [71, Problem 10.5.3], it follows from the progressive measurability in
Definition 3.15 (i), that bǫ, σǫ are F−progressively measurable. By Lemma 7.1, let Pǫ be a weak solution to
the SDE of Theorem 3.16 with coefficients (bǫ, σǫ). Similarly to Lemma 7.1, there exists ǫn −→ 0 such that Pǫn
converges to some P ∈ P weakly. Recall (7.2) and define M ǫ and N ǫ by replacing (b, σ) above with (bǫ, σǫ).
Then, for any s < t and ηs ∈ C0b (Fs), following similar arguments as in Lemma 7.1 we have, for any m ≥ 1,
E
P
[
M ǫms,t ηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pǫn
[
M ǫms,t ηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pǫn
[(
M ǫms,t −M ǫns,t
)
ηs
]
= lim
n→∞
E
Pǫn
[
ηs
∫ t
s
[bǫm − bǫn ](r,X·)dr
]
.
Thus ∣∣EP[Ms,tηs]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣EP[M ǫms,t ηs]∣∣+ ∣∣EP[ηs(Ms,t −M ǫms,t )]∣∣
≤ C lim inf
n→∞
E
Pǫn
[∫ t
s
|[bǫm − bǫn ](r,X·)|dr
]
+ CEP
[∫ t
s
|[bǫm − b](r,X·)|dr
]
≤ C lim inf
n→∞
E
Pǫn
[∫ t
s
[1(Ωǫnr )c + 1(Ωǫmr )c ]dr
]
+ CEP
[ ∫ t
s
1(Ωǫmr )cdr
]
≤ Cǫm.
Since m is arbitrary, we have EP
[
Ms,tηs
]
= 0 for all ηs ∈ C0b (Fs). That is, M is an P−martingale. Similarly, N
is an P−martingale, so that P is a weak solution to the SDE of Theorem 3.16.
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